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Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment 
L. Song Richardson† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In recent years, scholars have demonstrated that judges of-
ten construct legal theories based upon inaccurate assumptions 
about human behavior.1 Often, the behavioral assumptions 
embedded in legal doctrine are unstated. In fact, because “these 
assumptions seem self-evidently correct, even when they are 
wrong . . . judges sometimes incorporate empirically testable 
social science claims into their legal reasoning without even no-
ticing that they are doing so.”2  
Behavioral realist scholars argue that judges should not 
base their theories of human behavior on a purely conceptual, a 
priori process, but rather on the best empirical scientific evi-
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 1. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Real-
ism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treat-
ment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1002 (2006). For related work exploring the ef-
fects of situational factors on behavior, see, for example, Adam Benforado, 
Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333 (2010) and Jon 
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Per-
spective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004).  
 2. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1, at 1002. 
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dence that exists.3 These scholars primarily utilize the science 
of implicit social cognition to test the embedded behavioral as-
sumptions about human decisionmaking and judgments con-
tained within legal doctrine.4 This science combines the lessons 
of social psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neu-
roscience5 to examine mental processes that occur outside of 
conscious awareness and that operate without conscious con-
trol.6 Employing this science, these scholars critique legal doc-
trine and challenge courts to take accurate theories of human 
behavior into account or to explain their failure to do so.7  
Largely absent from the behavioral realist conversation 
thus far are Fourth Amendment scholars.8 The void is surpris-
ing because at the core of the Fourth Amendment rests con-
cerns about police-citizen interactions. The science of implicit 
social cognition (the science) can contribute much to the under-
standing of police behavior, especially as it relates to the 
treatment of nonwhites.  
 
 3. Id. at 1001. 
 4. See generally Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
945 (2006).  
 5. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, A Future History of Implicit Social Cogni-
tion and the Law 2 (Aug. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458678; see also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit In-
group Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 
17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 144 (2004) (describing the evolution of social cogni-
tion). For a comprehensive history of the science of implicit bias and critiques, 
see John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Execu-
tive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 42–46 (2009). 
 6. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral 
Realist Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1064–65; Kang 
& Lane, supra note 5, at 14–16; Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1489, 1571–72 (2005); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1. 
 8. But see Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles 
to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judg-
ment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7 (2010). Other criminal procedure scholars 
have highlighted the need to pay more attention to social science. See, e.g., 
Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Transparent Adjudication and So-
cial Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 733, 736 (2000) (“The most current and reliable empirical and 
social scientific evidence must inform the normative judgments at the heart of 
constitutional criminal procedure.”); see also David A. Harris, What Criminal 
Law and Procedure Can Learn from Criminology Symposium, 7 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2009); Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 31, 33 (2009). 
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Consider hit rates or “arrest efficiency”9 as an example. Hit 
rates are the rates at which the police find contraband or other 
evidence of criminal activity when they conduct a stop and 
search.10 Hit-rate data, when available,11 consistently demon-
strate that stops and searches of whites are more successful in 
yielding evidence of criminal activity than stops of blacks, or 
that the rates are at least equal. In Minnesota, for example, the 
hit rates for finding contraband are 11.17 percent for blacks 
and 23.53 percent for whites.12 In Los Angeles, frisked blacks 
are forty-two percent less likely than whites to be found with 
weapons, twenty-five percent less likely to be found with drugs, 
and thirty-three percent less likely to be found with other con-
traband.13 Similar results have been obtained in New York,14 
 
 9. This phrase is borrowed from Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of 
the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context 
of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 821 (2007). 
 10. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the 
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Pro-
filing More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2004). 
 11. Most jurisdictions do not gather data on police stops, searches, and 
frisks, and thus do not have the data necessary to calculate hit rates. R. Ri-
chard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection 
Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1102 (2001); David Rudovsky, 
Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops 
and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 304–06 (2001). In fact, 
law enforcement agencies frequently and vociferously object to data collection 
efforts. Rudovsky, supra, at 305. 
 12. UNIV. OF MINN. INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, MINNESOTA STATEWIDE 
RACIAL PROFILING REPORT 36 (2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/irp/ 
racialprof/aggregate%20report%2092303.pdf.  
 13. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE 
OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47. 
 14. Statistics gathered by the New York Police Department for the first 
nine months of 2009 demonstrate that eighty-four percent of pedestrians 
stopped were either black or Hispanic. Bob Herbert, Jim Crow Policing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A26, available at 2010 WLNR 2156316. Yet, only 1.6 
percent of the blacks and 1.5 percent of the Hispanics stopped were found in 
possession of contraband. Police stopped whites far less (about sixteen percent 
of the time), but found contraband 2.2 percent of the time. Id. In 2006, the hit 
rate for white suspects was 6.4 percent compared to 5.7 percent for black sus-
pects. Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke Pot, but Blacks Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 23, 2009, at A24, available at 2009 WLNR 25781059 (noting that in 2008, 
blacks were seven times more likely and Latinos four times more likely than 
whites to be arrested for marijuana possession, even though whites were the 
heaviest users of marijuana); see also Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as 
Pretext: Marijuana, Race and the New Disorder in New York City Street Polic-
ing, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 591, 604–24 (2010) (analyzing data on marijuana 
arrests in New York City and finding unwarranted disparities). 
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Illinois,15 Rhode Island,16 Missouri,17 and West Virginia.18 Yet, 
the police consistently stop and search blacks at higher rates 
than whites.19  
I do not dispute the fact that conscious racial bias against 
blacks can explain why the police continue to disproportionate-
ly stop and search blacks despite the hit-rate data.20 However, 
 
 15. ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS 
STATISTICS STUDY 12–13 (2008), available at http://www.dot.state.il.us/ 
travelstats/ITSS%202008%20Annual%20Report.pdf (“[P]olice are 1.6 times 
more likely to find contraband in the vehicle driven by a Caucasian driver.”). 
 16. “African Americans and Latinos were much more likely to be stopped 
by police and much more likely to be searched once stopped, even though 
Whites were more likely to be found with contraband.” ACLU, THE 
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC PROFILING IN THE UNITED STATES 62 
(2009) (citing AMY FARRELL & JACK MCDEVITT, RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP 
STATISTICS DATA COLLECTION STUDY 2004–2005, at 79 (2006)), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf.  
 17. A 2007 report found that blacks were sixty-six percent more likely 
than whites to be stopped, and 1.79 times more likely to be searched than 
whites. The hit rates for contraband were twenty-three percent for whites and 
17.6 percent for blacks. Executive Summary on 2007 Missouri Vehicle Stops, 
MO. ATT’Y GEN., http://ago.mo.gov/racialprofiling/2007/racialprofiling2007.htm 
(last visited May 6, 2011).  
 18. Blacks and Latinos are 1.5 times more likely to be stopped than 
whites, and 2.5 times more likely to have their vehicles searched despite the 
fact that minority drivers are less likely to have contraband. West Virginia 
Traffic Stop Study: 2009 Final Report, W. VA. DIVISION JUST. & COMMUNITY 
SERVICES, http://www.djcs.wv.gov/SAC/Pages/WVTrafficStopStudy.aspx (last 
visited May 6, 2011). 
 19. In New York, for example, blacks were stopped twenty-three percent 
more often than whites and this proportion of stops was not explained by pre-
vious arrest rates. Gelman et al., supra note 9, at 817. In Los Angeles, blacks 
were more than twice as likely as whites to be stopped. AYRES & BOROWSKY, 
supra note 13, at 5; see also Rudovsky, supra note 11, at 340–42 (describing a 
study of stops and frisks on the streets of Pennsylvania showing disproportion-
ate stops of black pedestrians, especially in white-dominated areas). Moreover, 
there is reason to believe that hit rates, where available, may actually under-
represent the number of innocent blacks who are stopped because officers may 
fail to accurately report the number of innocents they encounter. See, e.g., Ru-
dovsky, supra note 11, at 312 (giving the example of police officers falsifying 
records of the race of those stopped and searched).  
 20. Economists and civil liberties scholars both provide this explanation 
when the hit rate is lower for blacks than for whites. See Harcourt, supra note 
10, at 1276–78 nn.2–14. Professor Harcourt argues that economic models are 
flawed because their definition of “success” relates to maximizing the rates of 
successful searches. He argues that “[t]he proper goal for the police is to min-
imize the social cost of crime.” Id. at 1295; see also Donna Coker, Addressing 
the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 836–39 (2003) (describing a study showing that while 
officers sought search warrants for drugs more often for blacks, the success 
rates for finding drugs was higher for whites). 
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the operation of implicit biases can create similar results. The 
science of implicit social cognition demonstrates that individu-
als of all races have implicit biases in the form of stereotypes 
and prejudices that can negatively and nonconsciously affect 
behavior towards blacks.21 The implicit stereotype consists of 
the cultural stereotype of blacks, especially young men, as vio-
lent, hostile, aggressive, and dangerous.22 In the policing con-
text, implicit stereotypes can cause an officer who harbors no 
conscious racial animosity and who rejects using race as a 
proxy for criminality to unintentionally treat individuals differ-
ently based solely upon their physical appearance. 
As a result of implicit biases, an officer might evaluate be-
haviors engaged in by individuals who appear black 
as suspicious even as identical behavior by those who appear 
white would go unnoticed. In other words, even when officers 
are not intentionally engaged in conscious racial profiling, im-
plicit biases can lead to a lower threshold for finding identical 
behavior suspicious when engaged in by blacks than by 
whites.23  
Conscious racial profiling likely multiplies the effects of 
implicit bias on police behavior. Assume for a moment that of-
 
 21. See, e.g., Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious 
Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 
500 (2004) (finding that both black and white probation and police officers 
have implicit biases against black juveniles); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 
949–52 (2006); Kang, supra note 7, at 1499–506; Kristin A. Lane et al., Implic-
it Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 439–44 (2007); 
Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and 
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 20 (2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et 
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1195, 1197–201 (2009). For a fascinating discussion on the myriad of 
ways to conceptualize racial bias and the absence of definitional consensus, 
see R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially 
Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1182–89 (2006). 
 22. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnici-
ty to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325 (2002) [hereinafter Correll, Dilemma]; Patricia G. 
Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The Prince-
ton Trilogy Revisited, 21 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1139, 1146–49 
(1995); John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their Cogni-
tive Representations, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 32–36 (1986); 
Joachim Krueger, Personal Beliefs and Cultural Stereotypes About Racial 
Characteristics, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 536, 545–47 (1996). 
 23. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of 
Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1976); infra Part II. 
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ficers engaged in profiling will only approach and question 
those blacks whose behavior they deem suspicious. The prob-
lem is that focusing attention on blacks with the assumption 
that they are more likely to be engaged in criminal activity ac-
tivates implicit biases. These biases then influence how officers 
interpret the ambiguous behaviors they observe. Consequently, 
whether or not officers are engaged in conscious racial profil-
ing, they may stop more blacks than whites, but they will be 
more accurate when they stop whites because more unambig-
uous evidence of criminal activity is necessary before they will 
evaluate the behavior as suspicious. 
This Article argues that the behavioral-realist approach is 
important to the study of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and policing. The Amendment is primarily concerned with pro-
tecting individual privacy against arbitrary government intru-
sion.24 In their efforts to protect privacy, judges often make as-
sumptions related to police decisionmaking, judgments, and 
perceptions. To the extent that courts construct Fourth 
Amendment doctrine based upon behaviorally unrealistic as-
sumptions about an officer’s abilities in these areas, the result-
ing doctrine will not adequately protect privacy.  
This Article demonstrates the efficacy of behavioral real-
ism in the Fourth Amendment context by utilizing its frame-
work to scrutinize the Court’s stop-and-frisk jurisprudence. My 
primary focus is on pedestrian stops rather than traffic stops. 
Traffic stops and the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. 
United States25 will be the subject of a future article. 
The Court’s stop-and-frisk doctrine allows invasions upon 
individual privacy when police officers judge that an individu-
al’s actions are reasonably suspicious. The Court’s assumptions 
about an officer’s ability to make these judgments do not with-
stand empirical scrutiny when tested against the science. The 
failure to be behaviorally realistic leads to policing that inade-
quately protects privacy while simultaneously failing to further 
effective law enforcement.  
This Article argues that if the Fourth Amendment is to 
realize its normative commitment to obtain the appropriate 
balance between privacy and security, courts should reconsider 
their behavioral assumptions about police decisionmaking and 
judgments of criminality. Otherwise, the privacy protections of-
 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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fered by the Fourth Amendment will be a scarce commodity for 
those communities most affected by the operation of implicit 
biases on the police. This Article offers specific suggestions for 
“[r]eckon[ing] with”26 implicit bias in policing and the Fourth 
Amendment.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the 
science of implicit bias, including a discussion of how implicit 
biases can affect police-citizen interactions.27 Since blacks have 
been the focus of implicit social cognition research, this Article 
focuses on them. Part II applies the behavioral realist frame-
work to the Fourth Amendment’s stop-and-frisk doctrine, re-
vealing the doctrine’s perverse effects on privacy and policing. 
It ends with some tentative proposals for doctrinal reform. Part 
III suggests structural changes within police departments to 
ameliorate the effects of implicit bias on police behavior. This 
Article concludes that the behavioral realist approach is impor-
tant to the study of the Fourth Amendment and urges criminal 
procedure scholars to utilize its methods. 
 
 26. This phrase is borrowed from Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317 (1987). In his groundbreaking article, Professor Lawrence introduced 
the science of unconscious racism based upon psychoanalytic theory and dis-
cussed its application to the law. As the title of his article suggests, he urged 
scholars and judges to “[r]eckon[ ] with unconscious racism.” Id. In contrast, 
this Article does not address Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Rather, it focuses 
on the new science of implicit social cognition. This Article joins many prior 
scholars who have used this science to explore contemporary racial bias. See, 
e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role 
of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1893, 1908–11 (2009); Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1064; Kang, supra note 
7; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1; Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 471, 536–49 (2008); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equal-
ity: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 
354 (2007); Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The 
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190–
98 (2010); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, La-
tinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 55, 74–77 (2009); Symposium on Behavioral Realism, supra 
note 4. For a recent critique of unconscious bias, see Ralph Richard Banks & 
Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter? Law, Politics, 
and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009). 
 27. See, e.g., Jamie L. Flexon et al., Exploring the Dimensions of Trust in 
the Police Among Chicago Juveniles, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 180, 182 (2009) (noting 
the “paucity of research on Latinos’ responses to police contacts”).  
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I.  OVERVIEW OF IMPLICIT BIASES   
Research in the field of implicit social cognition repeatedly 
demonstrates that individuals of all races have nonconscious or 
implicit biases that have behavioral consequences. This Part 
provides an overview of the science, with an emphasis on those 
behavioral consequences of relevance to police interactions with 
citizens. 
A. RACIAL CATEGORIZATION  
Human beings categorize people and objects “in order to 
make sense of experience. Too many events occur daily for us to 
deal successfully with each one on an individual basis; we must 
categorize in order to cope.”28 Racial categorization, similar to 
the general categorization process, is largely automatic;29 in 
other words, it occurs unintentionally and without conscious 
awareness.30 
Racial categorization activates31 stereotypes and atti-
tudes.32 Psychologists distinguish between stereotypes, which 
 
 28. Lawrence III, supra note 26, at 337.  
 29. ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 17–18 (1999); Susan T. Fiske & Ste-
ven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from Category-Based 
to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Atten-
tion and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4, 23–
24 (1990) (describing studies which demonstrate that categorization occurs 
immediately). For a summary of automaticity, including methods for testing it, 
see Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002).  
 30. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 266. Many processes contain both automatic 
and controlled features. Id. at 267; see also Frederica R. Conrey et al., Separat-
ing Multiple Processes in Implicit Social Cognition: The Quad Model of Implic-
it Task Performance, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 470 (2005) (ar-
guing that most tasks involve both automatic and controlled processes); 
Patricia G. Devine & Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyp-
ing and Prejudice, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND 
DISCRIMINATION 61, 76–77 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009) (describing how in-
creased control by gathering additional information or correction by overcom-
ing bias can lead to reduced automatic stereotypical activation).  
 31. Activation refers to “the extent to which a stereotype is on one’s 
mind.” Ziva Kunda & Lisa Sinclair, Motivated Reasoning with Stereotypes: Ac-
tivation, Application, and Inhibition, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 12, 14 (1999). 
 32. Professor Jerry Kang coined the phrase “racial mechanics” to describe 
the process of racial categorization and the ascription of racial meanings to 
individuals. Kang, supra note 7, at 1497. For a discussion of the categorization 
process and its relationship to race, see David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. 
Sherman, Stereotypes, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 40–42 (Robert 
S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994). 
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are beliefs about a social group,33 and attitudes, which are feel-
ings or evaluations about a social group.34 Stereotypes and atti-
tudes can be both explicit (conscious) and implicit (noncon-
scious). While the processes are distinct, each process contains 
some elements of the other.35  
The science reveals that individuals have implicit beliefs 
and attitudes about racial groups that might conflict with their 
explicit or consciously held thoughts and feelings.36 Once acti-
vated, implicit stereotypes and attitudes can negatively influ-
ence individuals’ judgments and behaviors towards racial mi-
norities in ways that they are unaware of and largely unable to 
control.37 Studies related to these implicit biases are discussed 
in the next section. Later, in Part III, this Article will consider 
the circumstances under which individuals can control and cor-
rect for the operation of implicit biases. 
B. BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS  
This section discusses three ways in which implicit biases, 
specifically the operation of implicit stereotypes, can affect be-
haviors.38 First, implicit biases can result in increased scrutiny 
 
 33. Stereotypes are “mental association[s] between a social group or cate-
gory and a trait. The association may reflect a statistical reality, but it need 
not.” Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 21, at 949; see also KUNDA, supra note 
29, at 315 (defining stereotypes as “cognitive structures that contain our 
knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a social group”); Duncan, supra 
note 23, at 591 (defining stereotypes as “the general inclination to place a per-
son in categories according to some easily and quickly identifiable characteris-
tic such as age, sex, ethnic membership, nationality, or occupation, and then to 
attribute to him qualities believed to be typical of that category”). 
 34. Kang, supra note 7, at 1500 (referring to attitudes as “emotions, feel-
ings, and evaluations”); see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 21, at 948 
(defining attitudes as “an evaluative disposition—that is, the tendency to like 
or dislike, or to act favorably or unfavorably toward, someone or something. 
Explicit expressions of attitudes occur frequently, whenever we say we like or 
dislike someone or something.”). 
 35. See Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The 
Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 856, 857 n.1 (2001).  
 36. See John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Ef-
fects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996); Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 8. 
 37. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 266; see also Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1144–45 (2000); Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Intern-
ment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 956 (2004); Kang, supra note 
7, at 1503; Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1085.  
 38. Psychologists define behaviors as including “differential evaluations, 
judgments, and physical behaviors.” Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 21 n.98. 
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of certain citizens based upon their racial appearance. Second, 
these biases can affect the evaluation of ambiguous behavior, 
causing identical behavior to be interpreted differently depend-
ing upon the racial appearance of the person performing the 
act.39 Finally, implicit biases can cause individuals to treat 
members of different racial groups disparately.40  
1. Increased Scrutiny 
Researchers consistently find that blacks, especially young 
black men, capture attention before whites do.41 This occurs 
nonconsciously and automatically.42 Scientists attribute this 
difference in attention to the fact that people have automatic 
and rapid threat reactions toward black men.43 Indeed, brain 
scans demonstrate that people show more activation of the 
amygdala, a portion of the brain associated with fear, when 
viewing faces of black men versus white men.44  
 
For a discussion of the behavioral effects of implicit bias, see David M. Amodio 
& Patricia G. Devine, Stereotyping and Evaluation in Implicit Race Bias: Evi-
dence for Independent Constructs and Unique Effects on Behavior, 91 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 653–54 (2006). 
 39. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 40. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 41. Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of 
Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1326–27 (2008). 
 42. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual 
Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881, 883, 885–87 (2004) 
(finding that research subjects, primed with crime-related words or photo-
graphs below the level of conscious awareness, were drawn to black faces ear-
lier and for longer time periods than to white faces). 
 43. Trawalter et al., supra note 41, at 1322. 
 44. E.g., Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-
Related Amygdala Activity in African-American and Caucasian-American In-
dividuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720, 721 (2005). The strength of amygda-
la activation correlates with implicit bias scores related to racial attitudes. 
Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evalua-
tion Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 730–
33 (2000). Researchers found stronger amygdala responses when they pre-
sented the pictures of black faces subliminally. William A. Cunningham et al., 
Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces, 15 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 809 (2004) (finding that the stronger reactions were corre-
lated significantly with scores from the Implicit Association Test (IAT)—a test 
which reveals implicit biases); Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the 
Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11 
NEUROREPORT 2351, 2353 (2000) (demonstrating that subjects showed greater 
amygdala activation to outgroup faces); Andreas Olsson et al., The Role of So-
cial Groups in the Persistence of Learned Fear, 309 SCIENCE 785, 785–86 
(2005) (demonstrating that humans more readily show a fear response to out-
group members); Damian Stanley et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Atti-
tudes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 164, 165 (2008) (noting that amygdala activation is 
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Surprisingly, conscious racial attitudes do not predict at-
tentional bias.45 Rather, what predicts how quickly an individ-
ual’s attention is automatically (nonconsciously) drawn to 
blacks is the strength of the perceiver’s implicit association be-
tween blacks and danger.46 Those for whom the implicit black-
danger association is highly accessible47 are quicker to pay at-
tention to black faces than white faces. These individuals also 
tend to pay attention for longer periods of time to black indi-
viduals, though this increase in attentional holding of black 
faces versus white faces is marginal.48 Those for whom the 
danger stereotype is not as accessible do not demonstrate at-
tentional bias.49  
2. Biased Evaluations  
For over sixty years, social psychologists have demonstrat-
ed that black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and 
dangerous.50 That these cultural stereotypes affect the evalua-
tion of behaviors performed by blacks was powerfully demon-
strated in a study that required participants to rate ambiguous 
 
associated with fear). But see Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling 
Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Acti-
vation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56, 61 (2005) (demonstrating that amygdala activa-
tion to outgroup members is not inevitable). Researchers have also found that 
a variety of physiological responses occur when whites are exposed to blacks, 
including sweating, increased heart rate, facial twitches, and increased eye 
blink. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 181, 183 (2005) 
[hereinafter Eberhardt, Imaging Race]. 
 45. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, supra note 44, at 183–84; Eberhardt et al., 
supra note 42, at 884–85 (finding no correlation between the explicit biases 
and reaction times of study participants). 
 46. Nicole C. Donders et al., Danger Stereotypes Predict Racially Biased 
Attentional Allocation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1328, 1332 (2008). 
 47. Accessibility refers to how quickly and easily a particular idea or con-
cept comes to mind, consciously or nonconsciously. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY 
E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 60 (2008) 
(“[F]requently activated ideas come to mind more easily than ideas that have 
not been activated.”).  
 48. Donders et al., supra note 46, at 1331. 
 49. Id. at 1332.  
 50. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 876 (“The stereotype of black Amer-
icans as violent and criminal has been documented by social psychologists for 
almost 60 years.” (citations omitted)); Trawalter et al., supra note 41, 1322 
(“There is overwhelming evidence that young black men are stereotyped as 
violent, criminal, and dangerous, . . . both implicitly as well as explicitly.” (ci-
tations omitted)); see also Devine & Elliot, supra note 22, at 1139; Duncan, su-
pra note 23, at 591. 
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physical contact between two people. The researcher hypothe-
sized:  
If one believes that blacks are more prone to violent acts than whites, 
it is reasonable to assume that the concept of violence is more acces-
sible when viewing a black than when viewing a white committing 
the same act. In other words, the threshold for labeling an act as vio-
lent [would be] lower when viewing a black actor than when viewing a 
white actor.51 
To test this hypothesis, researchers had white subjects 
watch a video of two men engaged in a discussion that grew in-
creasingly heated.52 The subjects were unaware that the men 
were actors following a script. Instead, they were told that they 
were observing a discussion occurring in another room.53  
Researchers asked the subjects to rate the behavior of the 
two men at various points during the discussion. Eventually, 
one man pushed the other and the subjects had the option of 
rating the contact as horsing around, dramatic, aggressive, or 
violent.54 Researchers manipulated the race of the pusher and 
the victim in the videos to test whether race would affect the 
subjects’ perceptions of the push.55  
Remarkably, the actor’s race significantly influenced how 
subjects evaluated the contact. When the victim was white and 
the person initiating the physical contact was black, seventy-
five percent of the subjects interpreted the shove as violent.56 
Only six percent described it as horsing around or dramatic.57 
The results were markedly different when the victim was black 
and the pusher was white. In this scenario, only seventeen per-
cent of the subjects labeled the contact as violent.58 Instead, 
forty-two percent of the subjects rated the white perpetrator as 
horsing around or being dramatic.59 Finally, when the two ac-
tors were black, the perpetrator’s behavior was rated as more 
aggressive than when the two individuals were white—sixty-
nine percent versus thirteen percent.60  
 
 51. Duncan, supra note 23, at 591 (citation omitted).  
 52. Id. at 592. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 594–95. 
 55. Id. at 595. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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The race of the individuals also affected whether the re-
search subjects attributed the shove to an individual’s disposi-
tion or to situational factors. Again, researchers observed sta-
tistically significant differences. When the harmdoer was black, 
subjects attributed the shove to dispositional characteristics.61 
Yet, when the harmdoer was white, subjects more often attrib-
uted the shove to situational factors.62  
The researchers concluded that negative stereotypes asso-
ciating blacks with violence explained why the subjects eval-
uated ambiguous behaviors as more aggressive when per-
formed by a black actor as opposed to a white actor.63 The 
presence of a black individual automatically brought negative 
black stereotypes such as violence to the forefront of the sub-
ject’s memory, making the trait more available for use in eval-
uating ambiguous behavior.64  
Other studies support the finding that individuals evaluate 
blacks more negatively than whites engaged in identical behav-
ior. In one study, black and white school-age children rated an 
ambiguous bump in the hallway as more aggressive when per-
formed by a black actor rather than a white actor.65 In another, 
subjects evaluated the same facial expression as more hostile 
on a black face than on a white face.66 In a third study using 
buttons labeled “shoot” and “don’t shoot” as a weapon’s trigger, 
the nonconscious activation of negative black stereotypes 
caused individuals more quickly to shoot a potentially hostile 
black than a potentially hostile white.67 Importantly, a recent 
 
 61. Id. at 596. 
 62. Id. at 597. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Auto-
matic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 7–8 
(1989) (demonstrating that nonconscious activation of negative black racial 
stereotypes results in evaluating ambiguous behavior as aggressive). 
 65. H. Andrew Sager & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral 
Cues in Black and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive 
Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595–96 (1980).  
 66. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Cate-
gorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 342, 342–45 (2004); see also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bo-
denhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of Facial 
Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 643 (2003) (demonstrating that implicit bias 
scores predicted how long it took white participants to judge when a hostile 
expression on a black face became nonhostile).  
 67. Correll, Dilemma, supra note 22, at 1317–18; B. Keith Payne, Weapon 
Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT 
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study demonstrates that extensive training can reduce this ef-
fect in police officers.68  
Negative black stereotypes also influence the evaluation of 
police behavior toward blacks. For instance, in one study, re-
searchers wanted to determine whether the stereotype asso-
ciating blacks with apes would affect how research subjects 
evaluated police behavior.69 The researchers found that white 
research subjects who had been shown images of apes sublimi-
nally (below the level of conscious awareness) were more likely 
to conclude that the police were justified in beating a black 
suspect than when they were not shown images of apes.70 How-
ever, viewing images of apes did not affect the subjects’ evalua-
tion of the police beating a white suspect.71  
Taken together, the science provides evidence that how 
people evaluate the behavior of others can depend on the race 
of the individual observed. This effect occurs without the eval-
uators being aware of the impact of race on their interpretation 
of behavior.72 This realization demonstrates the need to be cog-
nizant of implicit biases and to address them when thinking 
about solutions to the disparate treatment of blacks within the 
criminal justice system.  
3. Biased Treatment and Behavioral Confirmation  
Negative stereotypes and unfavorable attitudes toward 
blacks can cause individuals to treat them differently than 
nonstereotyped group members. One of the first experiments 
demonstrating this involved white subjects interviewing “job 
 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006) (noting that split-second decisions 
limit individual ability to control for racial bias caused by racial stereotypes).  
 68. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and 
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1006, 1020–22 (2007) [hereinafter Correll, Thin Blue Line] (finding that al-
though police officers activate negative black stereotypes, they do not exhibit 
shooter bias to the same extent as civilians, and suggesting that this is the re-
sult of their extensive training). For a fuller discussion, see infra notes 250–66 
and accompanying text. 
 69. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Histori-
cal Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 293 (2008). 
 70. Id. at 302. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 304. 
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applicants.”73 Researchers trained the purported applicants to 
respond to interview questions in a standard format so that any 
differences in the treatment they received from the interviewer 
would be attributable to race.  
The results demonstrated that white interviewers treated 
black and white job applicants differently.74 When the appli-
cant was black, the white interviewer maintained greater phys-
ical distance, made more speech errors, and ended the inter-
view sooner than when the applicant was white.75 Researchers 
concluded that these behavioral differences resulted from the 
negative stereotypical beliefs the white interviewers held about 
the black job applicants.76 
This interview study did not specifically test whether im-
plicit bias caused the negative treatment of blacks. However, 
more recent experiments make this connection. In one, re-
searchers asked participants to complete an exceedingly te-
dious computer task consisting of 130 trials.77 Before each trial, 
the participants were primed78 subliminally with photos of ei-
ther black or white faces. On the 130th trial, as planned, the 
computer program crashed and researchers told the partici-
pants that they would have to begin the entire task from the 
beginning.79  
Researchers videotaped the participants’ reactions to this 
news and later coded their reactions for hostility. The results 
demonstrated that subjects primed with black faces reacted 
with more hostility to the news than those primed with white 
faces.80 This occurred, the researchers concluded, because those 
 
 73. Carl O. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophe-
cies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 112 
(1974). 
 74. Id. at 114–15. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 119. 
 77. Bargh et al., supra note 36, at 238. 
 78. Priming makes concepts temporarily more accessible from memory 
and therefore facilitates a person’s ability to evaluate similar concepts more 
quickly. John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, Automatic Information 
Processing and Social Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented 
Outside of Conscious Awareness on Impression Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 438–39 (1982); Devine, supra note 64, at 8–9. Here, the 
priming was subliminal, which means it occurred below the level of conscious 
awareness. Bargh et al., supra note 36, at 238. Subliminal priming can be 
achieved by flashing words or pictures on a screen so quickly that subjects are 
unaware that they have seen images or words. Id. 
 79. Bargh et al., supra note 36, at 238. 
 80. Id. at 239. 
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primed with black faces automatically activated negative black 
stereotypes that then affected their behavior.81 Surprisingly, 
subjects acted more aggressively after the black-face prime, re-
gardless of whether they had negative attitudes toward 
blacks.82 
This study does not suggest that individuals will inevitably 
respond with aggression whenever black stereotype activation 
occurs. Rather, stereotype activation can cause aggressive be-
havior in situations where aggression is one possible appropri-
ate response. For example, when the computer crashed after 
approximately ten minutes of tedious work, reacting with ag-
gression or patience were both appropriate behavioral re-
sponses. The activation of negative black stereotypes tipped the 
balance in favor of an aggressive response. 
The negative treatment that blacks receive can cause them 
to respond in kind. This is known as the self-fulfilling prophecy 
or behavioral confirmation effect.83 Returning to the job inter-
view study discussed at the beginning of this section, research-
ers conducted a follow-up experiment to test whether a job ap-
plicant would reciprocate the interviewer’s negative nonverbal 
behaviors, causing the applicant “to behave in a way that con-
firms the original false definition.”84 The researchers trained 
white interviewers to give white job applicants either the “black 
treatment” or the “white treatment.”85 The “black treatment” 
replicated how the black job applicants had been treated in the 
earlier study.86 Thus, interviewers who gave applicants the 
black treatment maintained greater physical distance, made 
more speech errors, and ended the interview more quickly.87 In-
terviewers who gave subjects the white treatment did the oppo-
site.88  
The job interviews were videotaped and, later, individuals 
who were unaware of the nature of the experiment viewed the 
tapes and rated the applicant’s competence for the job. Just as 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation 
Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 
33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 542 (1997). 
 84. Word et al., supra note 73, at 109. 
 85. Id. at 115–19. The phrases “black treatment” and “white treatment” 
are my words for the experimental conditions. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 116–17. 
 88. Id. 
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the researchers predicted, the interviewer’s behavior toward 
the applicant affected the applicant’s behavior, which in turn 
affected how he was judged.89 Those applicants receiving the 
white treatment obtained better competence ratings.90 The 
study provides evidence that racial stereotypes influence inter-
personal interactions, causing stigmatized groups to react in 
ways that confirm the stereotype.91  
In another study testing self-fulfilling prophecy effects, re-
searchers paired white subjects to take part in a word-guessing 
game.92 Before beginning, one member of the pair was sublimi-
nally primed with either a black face or a white face. Later, in-
dividuals unaware of the priming judged the subjects for hostil-
ity. The results demonstrated that not only was the player 
primed with the black face judged as more hostile, but the 
player paired with that subject was also rated as acting with 
greater hostility.93  
Numerous researchers note that the originators of negative 
behavior will likely be “blissfully unaware . . . of the causal role 
that their own activities play in generating the behavioral evi-
dence that erroneously confirms their expectations.”94 One re-
searcher puts it thus: 
[B]ecause the effect of the stereotype on behavior was nonconscious—
the perceiver would have no conscious experience of choosing that 
mode of behavior. Thus, the perceiver’s subjective, phenomenal expe-
rience, and hence memory of the event, would be of the stereotyped 
group member’s unprovoked initial hostility. . . . But because one is 
not aware of one’s own role in provoking it, one may attribute it to the 
stereotyped group member (and, hence, the group).95  
 
 89. Id. at 117–19. 
 90. Id. at 118. 
 91. Id. at 119–20. 
 92. Chen & Bargh, supra note 83, at 548. 
 93. Id. at 552. 
 94. Id. at 544 (omission in original) (citation omitted); David L. Hamilton 
& Tima K. Trolier, Sterotypes and Sterotyping: An Overview of the Cognitive 
Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 150, 150 (John F. Do-
vido & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (“Given the perceiver’s awareness of 
the confirmatory nature of the target’s behavior and lack of awareness of his 
or her own role in producing it, it would seem particularly difficult to convince 
the perceiver that his or her stereotypic beliefs are wrong.”). 
 95. Bargh et al., supra note 36, at 242; see also Eric J. Vanman et al., The 
Modern Face of Prejudice and Structural Features that Moderate the Effect of 
Cooperation on Affect, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 941, 947 (1997) 
(demonstrating that whites asked to imagine working with black partners 
rated blacks more favorably, yet their involuntary physical responses, as 
measured with electromyography (EMG), were indicative of negative affect).  
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This behavioral confirmation effect “provide[s] a powerful 
mechanism by which stereotypes and prejudicial behavior are 
maintained, propagated and justified” since “the perceiver in-
terprets the target’s behavior in line with the expectancy and 
encodes yet another instance of stereotype-consistent behav-
ior.”96 
In conclusion, the results of over three decades of research 
provide disturbing evidence that implicit biases can influence 
how individuals respond to and interact with black Americans. 
These effects can occur spontaneously and without conscious 
intention. Individuals are often unaware that race had any ef-
fect on their behavior. Whether one consciously subscribes to 
negative stereotypes or holds racist attitudes, the mere pres-
ence of a black individual, or reminders of things stereotypical-
ly associated with blacks, can cause the automatic activation of 
negative stereotypes. This automatic activation makes traits 
associated with the stereotype, such as violence or aggression, 
more accessible and available for use in making judgments or 
evaluating behavior.97 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICE-CITIZEN INTERACTIONS 
Based on the science, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
police target, stop, and search blacks more often than whites 
based upon the operation of implicit biases. Implicit biases af-
fect whether behavior catches attention in the first place and 
whether the observer will interpret that behavior as sufficient-
ly suspicious to warrant further investigation. The science dem-
onstrates that people can interpret identical behavior different-
ly depending upon the racial appearance of the individual en-
gaged in it.  
 
 96. Chen & Bargh, supra note 83, at 542.  
 97. Duncan, supra note 23, at 591; see also John A. Bargh, The Automatic-
ity of Everyday Life, 10 ADVANCES SOC. COGNITION 3 (1997); John A. Bargh, 
The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and 
Control in Social Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 
32, at 1, 1–2; Chen & Bargh, supra note 83, at 545–46; Daniel T. Gilbert, 
Thinking Lightly About Others: Automatic Components of the Social Inference 
Process, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 189, 194 (James S. Uleman & John A. 
Bargh eds., 1989); James S. Uleman et al., People as Flexible Interpreters: Evi-
dence and Issues from Spontaneous Trait Inference, 28 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 215–16 (1996) (describing and reviewing 
literature on spontaneous trait inference). For a more recent treatment dis-
cussing both automatic and controlled processes from a dual-process model 
perspective, see generally Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 
107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101 (2000). 
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Hence, police attention may be drawn to black individuals 
in general, and to young men who look stereotypically black in 
particular,98 regardless of whether these individuals are en-
gaged in suspicious behavior. Once their attention is captured, 
automatic stereotype activation can cause officers to interpret 
behavior as aggressive, violent, or suspicious even if identical 
behavior performed by a white individual would not be so in-
terpreted.99 When officers approach the individual to confirm or 
dispel their suspicions, implicit biases can cause officers to be-
have aggressively without realizing it.100 The confronted indi-
vidual may respond in kind, fulfilling officers’ beliefs that the 
individual is suspicious and aggressive. This entire series of 
events, triggered not by conscious racial animus but by implicit 
racial biases, will likely result in officers conducting a frisk. All 
the while, officers will be unaware that the behavioral effects of 
their implicit bias triggered the entire chain of events. In the 
end, officers may stop and frisk black individuals, whom they 
would not have deemed suspicious if they had been white, not 
because of bigotry or conscious considerations of race, but be-
cause of implicit cognitions. 
 
 98. In one study, not only did police officers choose black faces more often 
than white faces when asked “Who looks criminal?,” but they also chose more 
stereotypically black faces more often. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 888–
89. The same significant effects did not occur when officers were asked to iden-
tify white faces. Id. Officers (mis)remembered black individuals despite the 
fact that the officers paid more attention to the black faces than the white fac-
es. Id. at 887–88. The ratings of how stereotypical an individual appeared 
were obtained from participants (who were not involved in the final study) 
who were asked to view a series of photographs of black and white individuals 
and to rate them based upon the physical criteria most often associated with 
either race. Id. at 888.  
In another study examining sentencing patterns in death cases, research-
ers found that the more stereotypically black features a criminal defendant 
had (broad nose, dark skin, thick lips), the more likely he was to receive a 
death sentence or a longer sentence. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking 
Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-
Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 385 (2006); see also Irene V. Blair 
et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 677 (2004) (finding that intrarace inmates with more Afro-
centric features received longer sentences despite the same criminal histories); 
Robert W. Livingston & Marilynn B. Brewer, What Are We Really Priming? 
Cue-Based Versus Category-Based Processing of Facial Stimuli, 82 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 17 (2002) (finding that individuals showed 
more implicit bias when viewing blacks who had more “prototypic” features). 
 99. See supra Part I.B. 
 100. See supra Part I.B. 
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Importantly, although empirical evidence demonstrates 
that implicit biases are ubiquitous, they are also malleable.101 
It is possible to exacerbate or moderate their effects on behav-
ior. Generally, an individual’s motivations and goals, as well as 
situational factors, can influence implicit biases.102 For in-
stance, implicit biases can be reduced through conscious 
awareness, conscious motivation and commitments to egalitar-
ianism, and intentional decisions to react a certain way upon 
encountering a stereotyped individual.103 Even asking people to 
be nonprejudiced can reduce implicit biases.104 Consequently, 
courts and police departments may be able to implement strat-
 
 101. See, e.g., Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Mod-
eration of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 837 (2001) (discussing mental imagery studies that dem-
onstrate that stereotypes are malleable); Blair, supra note 29 (reviewing liter-
ature that tests whether automatic stereotypes are malleable); Jost et al., su-
pra note 5, at 44–45; Kunda & Sinclair, supra note 31, at 18–20 (“[R]esearch 
provides suggestive but not indisputable evidence for the possibility that 
people may inhibit the activation of stereotypes in some circumstances.”); 
Wheeler & Fiske, supra note 44, at 61–62 (demonstrating that amygdala acti-
vation to outgroup members is not inevitable). Evidence of malleability is also 
found in neuroscientific studies. Devine & Sharp, supra note 30, at 76–80. In 
fact, certain studies demonstrate that some people who are low in prejudice 
may not activate racial stereotypes at all. Kunda & Sinclair, supra note 31 at 
15–16. One study demonstrated that exposure to positive examples of out-
group members could reduce implicit biases. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony 
G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Auto-
matic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806–07 (2001). But see Jennifer A. Joy-
Gaba & Brian Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial 
Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2010) (finding that while malleabili-
ty was shown after exposure to counterstereotypical racial group members, the 
effects were weak). 
 102. Blair, supra note 29. One well-known researcher in the field of social 
cognition has identified five motives that may influence automatic processes: 
belonging (the motivation to conform to the ingroup’s social norms), under-
standing (the motivation to share understandings with an ingroup), control-
ling (the motivation to individuate others in an attempt to accurately predict 
outcomes), enhancing the self (the motivation to protect one’s self-image), and 
trusting (the motivation to trust one’s ingroup, which usually means distrust-
ing the outgroup). Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended 
Thought and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 
117, 123–24 (2004). 
 103. Kunda & Sinclair, supra note 31, at 18–20. 
 104. See, e.g., Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic 
Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 852 (2001); see also 
Nilanjana Dasgupta, Mechanisms Underlying the Malleability of Implicit Prej-
udice and Stereotypes: The Role of Automaticity and Cognitive Control, in 
HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 
30, at 267, 278–79. 
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egies for reducing their effects on behavior.105 More specifics 
concerning the factors affecting the malleability of implicit bi-
ases are considered in Part III.  
Although the scientific evidence has much to contribute to 
understandings of police decisionmaking and judgment, judges 
continue to employ common-sense, intuitive theories of human 
behavior in crafting Fourth Amendment legal standards. As a 
result, the Court’s stop-and-frisk jurisprudence not only fails to 
achieve the appropriate balance between privacy and security, 
but also exacerbates the effects of implicit bias on behavior, 
leading to arrest inefficiencies.106 Part II examines the Court’s 
 
 105. For an extended and thoughtful discussion of techniques to increase 
“accountability-based policing” to address racial profiling, including sugges-
tions for police training, see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 145–207 
(2002). In many important ways, Harris’s suggestions acknowledge the impor-
tance of “situationism,” the recognition in social psychology that the situation 
and the pressures they impose have a more influential effect on behavior than 
a person’s “disposition” or personality. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yo-
sifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical 
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003); 
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1. Part IV of this Article builds from and adds 
to Harris’s significant work. Importantly, however, social psychologists are 
skeptical that accountability alone is sufficient to reduce implicit biases. See 
Jost et al., supra note 5, at 50, 62. 
 106. Some argue that the differential treatment of blacks is not evidence of 
explicit or implicit bias. Rather, it simply reflects differential crime rates. See, 
e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Per-
ils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1036 n.41 (2006). There are a num-
ber of responses to this. First, the statistics on hit rates suggest that we 
should be cautious about making this claim. Second, as Angela Davis has ar-
gued, it is difficult to use arrest statistics as evidence of criminality when the 
process of arrest involves so much discretion that “arrest statistics may both 
overestimate and underestimate actual criminal behavior. Furthermore, be-
cause no uniform method of documenting an officer’s decision not to arrest ex-
ists, we cannot know the extent to which such decisions skew the arrest statis-
tics currently used as evidence of criminality within particular racial groups.” 
Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1662 (1996); see also Coker, supra note 20, at 831–44 (cri-
tiquing reliance on crime statistics). In any case, even if the differential treat-
ment of blacks based upon the accuracy of the stereotype is rational, it may 
still be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimina-
tion,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 825, 848 (2003) (“The prohibition of rational discrimination is a central 
component of antidiscrimination doctrine—and it may be the most important 
aspect of antidiscrimination law on the ground.”). For additional responses in 
the literature challenging the claim that it is rational to focus law enforcement 
attention on blacks because there is a relationship between race and crime, 
see generally KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME 53–74 (2d 
ed. 2009), and Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, 
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 
790–801 (1994). 
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stop-and-frisk jurisprudence using the tools of behavioral real-
ism. 
II.  EXPOSING THE DOCTRINE   
This Part examines the behavioral assumptions embedded 
in the Fourth Amendment’s stop-and-frisk doctrine and tests 
them against the scientific evidence. Section A studies Terry v. 
Ohio, the case that scrutinized and sanctioned police stop-and-
frisk practices. Section B unmasks the flawed behavioral as-
sumptions contained in the doctrine and section C traces the 
outlines of some new doctrinal approaches that take into ac-
count the best empirical social-science evidence concerning de-
cisionmaking and judgment. 
A. TERRY V. OHIO 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court, for the first time, permitted of-
ficers to seize individuals and conduct a limited frisk for weap-
ons in the absence of probable cause but with the suspicion that 
the individual was armed and engaged in criminal activity.107 
The facts of Terry are as follows.108 Officer McFadden was on 
the lookout for shoplifters and pickpockets in the middle of the 
afternoon in downtown Cleveland.109 At some point, he noticed 
Terry and Chilton standing on a street corner.110 McFadden 
could not articulate “precisely what first drew his eye to 
them.”111 They just “didn’t look right,”112 he testified, even 
though they were dressed in topcoats, customary attire at the 
time.113 “[T]o be truthful,” he admitted, “I didn’t like them.”114 
Both Terry and Chilton were black.115 
McFadden watched the two men for ten minutes as they 
took turns walking down the street, looking into a store win-
 
 107. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 108. I only discuss the facts important to my analysis. 
 109. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. For McFadden’s full testimony, see State of Ohio v. Richard D. 
Chilton and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and 
Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1387, 1449 (1998) [hereinafter Sup-
pression Hearing]. 
 112. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.  
 113. Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 
MISS. L.J. 423, 430 (2004). 
 114. Suppression Hearing, supra note 111, at 1456. 
 115. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the 
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 964 (1999). 
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dow, and returning.116 Their behavior led McFadden to suspect 
that the two were casing a store in preparation for a daytime 
robbery.117 Without probable cause,118 McFadden grabbed Ter-
ry, spun him around, frisked him, and found a concealed weap-
on.119  
The issue before the Court was whether the Fourth 
Amendment permitted officers to seize and frisk individuals in 
the absence of probable cause.120 The Court answered the ques-
tion in the affirmative. It held that reasonable suspicion, and 
not the traditional probable cause standard, authorized officers 
to detain individuals for questioning and to conduct a limited 
search for weapons.121 In order to justify what is colloquially 
known as a “stop and frisk,”122 the reasonable suspicion test re-
quires an officer “to point to specific and articulable facts which 
. . . lead[] him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience 
that criminal activity may be afoot”123 or that the individual 
with whom he is interacting is armed and dangerous.124  
At the time Terry was decided, police stop-and-frisk prac-
tices were under intense scrutiny primarily because of their 
role in aggravating racial tensions between black communities 
and the police. Professor Tracey Maclin points out that the 
Court decided Terry only three months after a presidential 
 
 116. See Katz, supra note 113, at 431. 
 117. See id. at 432–33. 
 118. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 894 (1998) 
(“[N]o one really suggested that Officer McFadden in Terry had ‘probable 
cause’ to believe much of anything.”). 
 119. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7 (1968) (describing the search of Terry).  
 120. See id. at 4. 
 121. As other scholars have noted, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion was not 
crystal clear on the appropriate standard for conducting a stop and frisk. See, 
e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and 
Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1308–09 (1998) [hereinafter 
Maclin, Legacy]. However, the Terry decision now stands for the proposition 
that reasonable suspicion is the guiding standard for stops and frisks. See, e.g., 
John J. Bursch, Note, The 4 R’s of Drug Testing in Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. 
REV. 1221, 1227 n.39 (1996).  
 122. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. This was distinguished from other searches un-
der the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“In other 
words, police officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or 
searches without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowl-
edge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause.”). Probable 
cause is the “traditional standard” of the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).  
 123. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 30. 
 124. Id. at 27. 
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commission examining the 1967 race riots concluded that “hos-
tility between the police and the black community was a con-
tributing factor, and in some places, the factor, precipitating 
riots in several urban centers.”125 The Justices were also aware 
of the 1967 Report of the President’s Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice that criticized policing 
practices, including the “aggressive patrol tactics” used in com-
munities of color.126  
On the one hand, then, the Justices did not have “universal 
trust in the neutrality of the authorities.”127 Clearly, allowing 
officers to detain and frisk individuals solely on suspicion of 
criminal activity was a power subject to abuse.128 In fact, the 
decision represents one of the few instances in which the Court 
acknowledged issues of race in the Fourth Amendment con-
text.129 On the other hand, the Court did not want to be “agents 
who tied the hands of the police in dealing with intensely dan-
gerous and recurring situations on city streets.”130 
Through the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court at-
tempted a delicate balance, granting police the discretion to 
stop and frisk suspicious individuals while attempting simulta-
neously to protect individuals from unjustified encroachments 
upon their liberty and bodily integrity. The Court specifically 
noted that its decision should not “be taken as indicating ap-
proval of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative 
sphere . . . . [C]ourts still retain their traditional responsibility 
to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harass-
ing, or which trenches upon personal security without the ob-
 
 125. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
333, 363–65 (1998) [hereinafter Maclin, Race] (citations omitted). The Kerner 
Commission found that “‘[n]egroes firmly believe that police brutality and ha-
rassment occur repeatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestion-
ably one of the major reasons for intense Negro resentment against the po-
lice.’” Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS 158 (1968)). 
 126. Dudley Jr., supra note 118, at 893; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11 
(citing the report). 
 127. Dudley Jr., supra note 118, at 893.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14; see also Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 364–65 
(“[T]he Court signaled, albeit in an enigmatic footnote, that the judiciary must 
consider racial impact when determining the constitutional reasonableness of 
an intrusion.”). 
 130. Dudley, supra note 118, at 893. 
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jective evidentiary justification which the Constitution re-
quires.”131  
In keeping with its goal of cabining police discretion while 
simultaneously allowing the police to act on their suspicions in 
appropriate cases, the Court attempted to craft a test that pro-
hibited officers from acting on their “inchoate and unparticular-
ized suspicion[s] or ‘hunch[es],’” including racial hunches.132 In-
stead, “in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts.”133 “Any-
thing less,” the Court cautioned, “would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more sub-
stantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has con-
sistently refused to sanction.”134 
The next section exposes and examines the implicit behav-
ioral theories of police judgment and decisionmaking embedded 
in Terry and its progeny. It tests these theories against the 
available scientific evidence and reveals their flaws. The sec-
tion demonstrates that when the influence of implicit biases on 
policing is considered, the reasonable suspicion test may not be 
up to the task of preventing intrusions based upon nothing 
more than hunches. Rather, the test may facilitate policing that 
inadequately protects liberty while simultaneously failing to 
further effective law enforcement. 
B. BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS 
From the beginning, Terry has been the subject of sus-
tained critiques.135 I join those critiques because they reveal 
 
 131. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
 132. Id. at 27. 
 133. Id. at 21. 
 134. Id. at 22. 
 135. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 43, 43 (2009) (arguing that Terry and Whren help create and 
maintain racialized spaces); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amend-
ment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1035–36 (2002); Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the 
Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 671, 675 (2009); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspi-
cion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 681 
(1994) [hereinafter Harris, Factors] (describing the profiling of high-crime 
neighborhoods); David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of 
Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Frisking]; Lenese 
C. Herbert, Bête Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National Security, 
9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 155–57 (2003) (critiquing doctrinal failures to ad-
dress race-based policing); Katz, supra note 113, at 424; Andrew D. Leipold, 
Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent 
in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 568–69 (1998); Maclin, Race, 
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that Terry allows officers to act on conscious racial biases. 
However, largely absent from these prior critiques and sugges-
tions for Terry reform is consideration of the effects of noncon-
scious racial biases on police behavior.136  
Considering the effects of implicit biases on police behavior 
and decisionmaking is important for several reasons. First, 
doing so reveals that even officers who do not consciously con-
sider race while policing may unintentionally treat blacks more 
harshly and with more suspicion than whites. Furthermore, for 
those officers who do engage in race-conscious policing, implicit 
biases will exacerbate the effects of race on their judgments 
and behavior. Thus, doctrinal solutions that only address the 
problems of conscious racial profiling while ignoring the effects 
of implicit bias will likely fail to remedy arbitrary policing.  
Second, basing the doctrine on erroneous assumptions 
about police decisionmaking and judgment has the unintended 
effect of strengthening implicit biases. This is problematic be-
cause implicit biases can cause real harm. As a result of such 
biases, police officers in simulations were more likely to shoot 
unarmed black suspects than unarmed white suspects,137 and 
to misidentify black suspects more readily than white sus-
pects.138 Thus, the harm created by current doctrine is greater 
than scholars have previously recognized; the doctrine not only 
encourages racial stereotyping by supporting the idea that race 
is relevant to assessing criminality, but it also makes reducing 
the effects of implicit biases on behavior more difficult.139  
 
supra note 125, at 340–41; Maclin, Legacy, supra note 121, at 1272–73; 
Thompson, supra note 115, at 961; Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of 
African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional 
Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 443 (2004).  
 136. But see Thompson, supra note 115, at 983–86 (using cognitive psy-
chology to examine Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). This Article builds 
from Thompson’s approach by introducing the science of implicit bias, which 
was not fully developed at the time of his article. See Alex Geisinger, Rethink-
ing Profiling: A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR. L. 
REV. 657, 678 (2007) (discussing cognitive biases and the regulatory response 
to racial profiling).  
 137. E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for 
Police Officers’ Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 182 
(2005); see also Correll, Dilemma, supra note 22, at 1325 (same, but with civil-
ians). But see Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 68, at 1020 (finding that po-
lice performed better than civilians and attributing this result to training). 
 138. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 887–88.  
 139. See infra Part III.A (discussing studies that demonstrate how practic-
ing stereotypical associations can increase implicit bias).  
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Finally, the failure to consider the effects of implicit biases 
on behavior can result in suggestions for doctrinal reform that 
unintentionally exacerbate arbitrary policing. For example, in 
his groundbreaking article utilizing cognitive psychology to ex-
amine the racial component of Terry stops, Professor Anthony 
Thompson recommended that courts should, in some instances, 
permit officers to utilize race to justify Terry stops.140 Race 
would be used “not [as] a predictor of criminality . . . [but as] a 
rough but workable proxy for suspicion in certain circum-
stances.”141 Judges would then “scrutinize the officer’s motiva-
tions to determine if the circumstances in a given case war-
ranted this reliance on race.”142  
While the proposal seems sensible, a number of problems 
remain when viewed from the perspective of implicit bias. 
First, the proposal is underinclusive because it only affects 
those cases where an officer consciously relies on race. Hence, 
this solution does not address cases involving an officer who is 
genuinely unaware that race influenced his behaviors, percep-
tions, and judgments. Second, the proposal encourages the po-
lice to intentionally and consciously associate race with crimi-
nal suspicion, which may tend to exacerbate or strengthen 
implicit biases.  
The sections that follow scrutinize the flawed behavioral 
assumptions contained in current doctrine. These faulty as-
sumptions result in a jurisprudence that fails to protect non-
whites from arbitrary policing. 
1. Interpretation of Ambiguous Behavior  
In Terry, the Court constructed a test that allows officers to 
stop and frisk an individual based upon their interpretation of 
the individual’s ambiguous behavior.143 The test requires offi-
cers to justify stops and frisks by articulating the facts that led 
them to be reasonably suspicious of the individual.144 Given the 
Court’s acknowledgement that stop-and-frisk practices could be 
used to harass blacks, the articulation requirement can be in-
terpreted, in part, as the Court’s attempt to cabin officer discre-
tion to stop and frisk blacks based upon racial hunches.145 In-
 
 140. Thompson, supra note 115, at 1005.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 144. See id. at 21, 30. 
 145. Id. at 14.  
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stead, officers can only stop and frisk individuals when their 
behavior is objectively suspicious, regardless of their race.146 
The behavioral assumption underlying the reasonable sus-
picion test is that a well-intentioned officer147 is capable of in-
terpreting identical behavior similarly, regardless of the race of 
the individual they are observing. While this behavioral as-
sumption is intuitively appealing, it does not withstand scien-
tific scrutiny. Officers may nonconsciously use a more lenient 
standard when judging the behavior of whites versus blacks. 
The science demonstrates that race can affect an officer’s 
interpretation of ambiguous behavior.148 Nonconscious stereo-
type activation in the presence of black individuals can cause 
officers to interpret ambiguous behaviors performed by blacks 
as suspicious, aggressive, and dangerous while similar behav-
iors engaged in by whites would go unnoticed.149 Implicit biases 
may affect even officers who do their best to avoid (consciously) 
treating people differently based upon race.  
The implicit racial bias that may cause an officer to inter-
pret ambiguous behaviors engaged in by blacks as suspicious 
can be understood as an inarticulable racial hunch. That is be-
cause the officer’s feelings of suspicion are not based upon some 
objective and unambiguously suspicious behavior that he would 
inevitably have considered suspicious regardless of the race of 
the person engaged in it. Rather, his evaluation of the behavior 
as suspicious may be unintentionally influenced by noncons-
cious, inarticulable racial biases—in other words, a noncons-
cious racial hunch. 
Upon feeling suspicious, an officer easily can articulate the 
specific facts that he believes led him to feel suspicious without 
realizing that his initial feelings of suspicion may have been 
based on a racial hunch caused by the operation of implicit ra-
cial bias. In other words, the officer will not realize that if the 
individual he had observed had been white, he may not have 
noticed the behavior or may have interpreted it as horseplay. 
By allowing officers to act on their interpretation of ambiguous 
 
 146. Id. at 30 (holding that officers may stop and frisk when “criminal ac-
tivity may be afoot”). 
 147. I focus on the well-intentioned officer because, as the Terry Court ac-
knowledged, the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment is likely ill 
equipped to deter officers who choose to harass blacks with little regard for 
whether evidence will be admissible in court. 
 148. See Duncan, supra note 23, at 591. 
 149. Id. 
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behaviors, the reasonable suspicion test actually permits, rath-
er than prevents, actions based upon racial hunches.  
2. Officer Experience  
When determining whether an officer’s stop and frisk is 
justified by reasonable suspicion, the Terry Court wrote that 
“due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable infer-
ences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience.”150 This deference is justified by the be-
lief that an experienced officer can “draw[] inferences and 
make[] deductions [from facts] . . . that might well elude an un-
trained person.”151 
The Court’s behavioral assumption is that officers, based 
upon their experiences, are better than civilians at distinguish-
ing innocent from guilty conduct. Presumably, as frequent ob-
servers of behavior, officers are better equipped to predict 
whether an individual’s behavior signals involvement in crimi-
nal activity.152 However, as with many common-sense beliefs 
about human behavior, this assumption goes too far. As the fol-
lowing two sections demonstrate, the nature of their jobs may 
lead officers to perform no better than civilians when it comes 
to differentiating criminal from noncriminal activity. They per-
haps may perform even worse in situations where nonwhites 
are involved. 
a. Thinking About Crime 
First, research demonstrates that thinking about crime can 
trigger nonconscious thoughts about blacks, which in turn acti-
vates negative black stereotypes.153 Researchers have found 
 
 150. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 151. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); see also Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“[A] reviewing court should take care 
. . . to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by . . . local law en-
forcement officers . . . . Through the lens of his police experience and exper-
tise.”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979) (deference is due to the “ob-
servations of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and 
articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the 
untrained observer”). 
 152. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 n.2 (“This situation is to be distinguished from 
the observations of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive 
and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to 
the untrained observer.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 876 (“The stereotype of 
Black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by social psy-
chologists for almost 60 years.”). 
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that the connection between blacks and crime has become en-
trenched and ubiquitous.154 Disturbingly, not only does seeing a 
black individual bring negative racial stereotypes to mind non-
consciously,155 but simply thinking about crime triggers implic-
it thoughts about blacks in police officers and civilians alike.156 
The researchers concluded that “[n]ot only are Blacks thought 
of as criminal, but also crime is thought of as Black.”157 This 
means that  
automatic associations [between Blacks and crime] may be activated 
and practiced substantially more than previously recognized—even in 
the absence of initial exposure to a social group member. In a crime-
obsessed culture, for example, simply thinking of crime can lead per-
ceivers to conjure up images of Black Americans that “ready” these 
perceivers to register and selectively attend to Black people who may 
be present in the actual physical environment.158 
Officers performing their job-related duties are necessarily 
thinking about crime, which activates implicit stereotypes of 
blacks.  
Once activated, these implicit stereotypes can cause offi-
cers nonconsciously to pay more attention to blacks than to 
whites.159 Then, these implicit biases may cause officers to in-
terpret the ambiguous behaviors of blacks as suspicious and 
criminal.160 
For instance, when looking for drug couriers161 at an air-
port, an officer nonconsciously may pay more attention to 
blacks and view their behaviors as suspicious while failing to 
notice similar behavior engaged in by whites. United States v. 
Mendenhall provides an example of this phenomenon.162 In 
that case, two Drug Enforcement Agency agents were at an 
airport in Detroit on the lookout for illegal drug trafficking.163 
They became suspicious of twenty-two-year-old Sylvia Men-
denhall as she disembarked from a plane arriving from Los An-
 
 154. See id. (describing the association between blacks and crime as 
“strong,” “consistent,” “frequent,” and “automatic”). 
 155. See supra Part II.B. 
 156. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 877–78.  
 157. Id. at 883. 
 158. Id. at 877. 
 159. Id. at 877–78, 886–87. 
 160. Id. 
 161. These profiles consist of an “informally compiled abstract of character-
istics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs.” United States v. Men-
denhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (1980). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 547.  
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geles,164 a source city for much of the heroin brought into De-
troit.165  
According to their testimony, they found her suspicious be-
cause she was the last person to leave the plane, she “‘appeared 
to be very nervous,’” and she “‘completely scanned the whole 
area’” before proceeding to baggage claim.166 Their suspicions 
were sufficiently aroused that they followed her.167 The officers 
testified that they became more suspicious when she walked 
past the baggage claim area without retrieving any luggage168 
and when they overheard her obtain a boarding pass from the 
ticket counter of another airline.169 
Although the agents’ suspicions had been aroused, all of 
Mendenhall’s actions were consistent with innocence. She was 
engaged in “the kind of behavior that could reasonably be ex-
pected of anyone changing planes in an airport terminal.”170 
She could have been the last person to disembark because the 
airline had assigned her a seat in the last row. She might have 
appeared nervous because she was afraid of missing a connect-
ing flight. Perhaps she scanned the arrival area after disem-
barking to find signs leading her to baggage claim, to the exit, 
or to another terminal. The fact that Los Angeles is a source 
city for heroin is only important to the extent that it explains 
why the agents were watching arrivals from this particular 
plane. Standing alone, it does not sufficiently explain the 
agents’ specific focus on Mendenhall since everyone leaving 
that plane would have been arriving from Los Angeles. The fact 
that she had tickets to another city could explain why she did 
not pick up any luggage at baggage claim. Indeed, one of the 
agents later admitted that he only found her failure to pick up 
luggage suspicious before he learned that she was changing 
planes.171  
I give these explanations simply to highlight that the offi-
cers’ interpretation of her behavior as suspicious was not the 
 
 164. Id. at 547, 558. 
 165. Id. at 547 n.1. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 547. 
 168. Id. at 547 n.1.  
 169. Id. at 564 (Powell, J., concurring). The DEA agent heard the ticket 
agent tell Mendenhall that “her ticket to Pittsburgh already was in order and 
that all she needed was a boarding pass for the flight.” Id. at 573 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 572. 
 171. Id. at 573 n.9. 
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only plausible one. Certainly, the conditional probability that 
Mendenhall was engaged in criminal behavior is greater when 
her actions are considered cumulatively. However, even when 
viewed as a whole, Mendenhall’s behavior was also consistent 
with innocence.  
While neither agent mentioned the fact that Mendenhall 
was black,172 her race is relevant. The automatic activation of 
negative racial meanings upon seeing Mendenhall could have 
affected the agents’ interpretation of her behavior. Of course, 
the agents could have been engaged in conscious racial profil-
ing. However, implicit bias also could explain their behavior. In 
fact, conscious racial profiling would only exacerbate the opera-
tion of implicit biases. 
The operation of implicit biases also can explain the “‘cha-
meleon-like way [that drug courier profiles have] of adapting to 
any particular set of observations.’”173 Former Supreme Court 
Justice Thurgood Marshall gave examples of inconsistent ex-
planations given by law enforcement officers as conduct fitting 
the drug courier profile. He noted that in different cases, offi-
cers testified that a suspect was suspicious because he was the 
first to get off the plane, the last to get off, or because he got off 
in the middle.174 The science of implicit bias provides an expla-
nation for these inconsistent accounts that does not require the 
assumption that the officers engaged in intentional and deceit-
ful after-the-fact explanations. Rather, the operation of implicit 
bias can cause individuals to evaluate behaviors differently de-
pending upon the race of the individual under scrutiny. What 
may seem suspicious in one instance may not seem so in anoth-
er simply depending upon whether racial stereotypes are non-
consciously activated.175 Since officers constantly are on the 
lookout for criminal activity, they likely are steeped in non-
 
 172. See id. at 558 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that Men-
denhall was black). 
 173. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J. dissent-
ing) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 174. Id.; see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 47–51 (1999). 
 175. Commentators and Supreme Court Justices alike have expressed 
skepticism about the seeming malleability of drug courier profiles. See, e.g., 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting); COLE, supra note 176, at 
47–51. Drug courier profiles were created originally by the Drug Enforcement 
Agency for use at airports. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to 
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 233–34 (1983). These profiles often contain 
race as a relevant factor. Id. at 234. Their use has expanded to highways. Mor-
gan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and 
Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 854 (1985).  
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conscious black stereotypes that influence their judgments and 
behaviors. 
b. Urban Environments 
Second, police often view blacks in environments that are 
urban and poor. Officers and courts typically describe these 
areas as “high crime” neighborhoods without empirical proof 
that they are actually high in crime.176 Research confirms that 
perceptions of disorder increase when a community is majority 
black instead of majority white, even when the neighborhoods 
are otherwise similarly situated.177  
Encountering blacks in stereotypical urban and poor envi-
ronments increases implicit biases by activating racial stereo-
types.178 In fact, researchers have found that officers working 
in urban environments exhibit higher levels of implicit bias 
than those who do not.179 Thus, an officer patrolling a poor, ur-
ban, majority-black neighborhood is more prone to judge ambig-
uous behaviors as suspicious, causing him to stop more indi-
viduals who are innocent. Judges may assume that—all things 
being equal—the police will be equally suspicious of a white in-
dividual in a white, urban, poor neighborhood as a black indi-
vidual in a black, urban, poor neighborhood. However, the so-
cial-science evidence demonstrates that this is not necessarily 
so.180 
In sum, officers’ experiences do not necessarily make them 
better able to distinguish guilty from innocent conduct. The na-
ture of their jobs requires them to think constantly about crime 
and they often encounter blacks in stereotypical environments. 
 
 176. See, e.g., Harris, Factors, supra note 135, at 672 n.134 (noting that po-
lice often attempt to justify their reasonable suspicion explanation by relying 
upon the moniker high-crime neighborhood); Johnson, supra note 175, at 255 
(arguing that courts can become complicit with officer prejudices and stereo-
types when they unquestioningly accept police conclusions that an area is high 
crime); Katz, supra note 113, at 500 (noting that the phrase “high crime 
neighborhood” is often a proxy for race). 
 177. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 336 (2004) (concluding that race plays a stronger role 
in perception of disorder than does actual observations of disorder). 
 178. Jamie Barden et al., Contextual Moderation of Racial Bias: The Impact 
of Social Roles on Controlled and Automatically Activated Attitudes, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 21 (2004) (noting that the effect of viewing 
stereotyped individuals in certain settings increases implicit bias). 
 179. Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 68, at 1015. 
 180. Thompson, supra note 115, at 959 n.5. 
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Consequently, officers may be more likely to be influenced by 
the operation of implicit biases than civilians, which may cause 
officers to incorrectly interpret ambiguous behavior as suspi-
cious when engaged in by blacks as opposed to whites. For this 
reason, the Court’s assumption that officers are better than ci-
vilians at distinguishing guilty from innocent conduct may not 
withstand scientific scrutiny when race is involved. 
3. Race Salience 
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has established that race 
can be relevant to determining if a reasonable suspicion of crim-
inality exists so long as it is not the sole factor.181 Not surpri-
singly then, police officers sometimes rely upon race to justify 
Terry seizures. In United States v. Weaver,182 for example, an 
officer indicated that he became suspicious of Mr. Weaver in 
part because Weaver was a “roughly dressed young Black 
male.” While acknowledging that “large groups of our citizens 
should not be regarded by law enforcement officers as presump-
tively criminal based upon their race,” the Eighth Circuit ap-
proved the officer’s reliance on race:  
[F]acts are not to be ignored simply because they may be unpleas-
ant—and the unpleasant fact in this case is that . . . race, when 
coupled with the other factors Hicks relied upon, was a factor in the 
decision to approach and ultimately detain Weaver. We wish it were 
otherwise, but we take the facts as they are presented to us, not as we 
would like them to be.183 
 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1975) 
(holding that referrals based largely on ancestry to secondary inspection areas 
at traffic checkpoints are permissible); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 885–87 (1974) (noting that ancestry is a relevant factor when com-
bined with others, but not standing alone); see also Banks, supra note 11, at 
1086–87 n.47 (acknowledging this view); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. 
Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 733 (2003) (same); David A. Harris, Using Race or 
Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment 
Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 428–35 (2003) 
(same). But see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Hispanic appearance is, in general, of such little proba-
tive value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor where particular-
ized or individualized suspicion is required. Moreover, we conclude, for the 
reasons we have indicated, that it is also not an appropriate factor.”). 
 182. United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 183. Id. at 394 n.2. Other factors the officer relied upon were his “own ex-
perience and . . . intelligence reports he had received from the Los Angeles au-
thorities that young male members of Black Los Angeles gangs were flooding the 
Kansas City area with cocaine.” Id. In his dissent, Judge Arnold noted the lack 
of empirical evidence to support the agent’s claim that drug courier passengers 
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Other courts have similarly affirmed the use of race to estab-
lish criminal suspicion.184 
When courts allow officers to utilize race to overcome 
shortcomings in demonstrating reasonable suspicion, they as-
sume that officers accurately remember their experiences and 
make sound correlations between race and criminality. The 
empirical evidence on memories and illusory correlations 
should lead courts to be more cautious.185  
Stereotypes about black criminality can affect memories 
about contacts with blacks. This can occur because people are 
more likely to encode events into memory that are consistent 
with their preexisting beliefs and expectations.186 As stated by 
noted social psychologist Ziva Kunda, “[m]uch of what we 
‘learn’ from experience may reflect our prior theories about re-
 
exhibit a degree of nervousness more pronounced than innocent airline pas-
sengers and that young black males from Los Angeles were more prone to be 
drug couriers than young white males. Id. at 397 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). 
 184. See, e.g., United States v. Meza-Meza, No. 99-10198, 2000 WL 286284, 
at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2000) (providing that “race can be one factor consid-
ered in establishing reasonable suspicion under all of the circumstances” (cita-
tion omitted)); United States v. Moss, No. 99-6510, 2000 WL 33121240, at *2–
3 & n.1. (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 2000) (same); United States v. Travis, 837 F. Supp. 
1386, 1391 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (“[T]he agents are of the belief that only a minute 
percentage of the air traveling public are couriers and that focusing on minori-
ties from the Los Angeles flights is an effective use of law enforcement re-
sources as indicated by the number of successful prosecutions.”). Courts also 
allow consideration of race when they permit officers to rely on drug courier 
profiles. These profiles often contain race as a relevant factor. Angela J. Davis, 
Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 430 (1997); Johnson, 
supra note 175, at 234. Although courts do not always countenance the use of 
race by police officers to establish criminality, these cases demonstrate that 
officers do consider race in determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists. 
See, e.g., United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Colo. 1990); State v. 
Graciano, 653 P.2d 683 (Ariz. 1982). 
 185. There is one study that supports the idea that more experienced offi-
cers may rely less on stereotypes in their judgments. See B. Michelle Peruche 
& E. Ashby Plant, The Correlates of Law Enforcement Officers’ Automatic and 
Controlled Race-Based Responses to Criminal Suspects, 28 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 198 (2006). In this study, “there was a marginally signifi-
cant effect of years on the force in predicting the degree of racial bias on the 
shooting simulation. More years in the law enforcement profession was related 
to less racial bias on the early trials . . . .” Id. 
 186. Myron Rothbart et al., Recall for Confirming Events: Memory 
Processes and the Maintenance of Social Stereotypes, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 343, 343–44 (1979); see also Claudia E. Cohen, Person Catego-
ries and Social Perception: Testing Some Boundaries of the Processing Effects 
of Prior Knowledge, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 444–48 (1981) 
(describing a study in which subjects were more likely to remember stereo-
type-consistent information). 
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ality rather than the actual nature of reality.”187 Because of 
both implicit and conscious biases, officers are likely to have 
better memories of individuals who confirm their suspicions of 
criminality than for those who do not.188  
One study has demonstrated that implicit stereotypes can 
affect the memory of police officers. In this study, implicit ster-
eotypes caused officers to unintentionally misidentify individu-
als with more stereotypically black features as people they had 
seen before.189 The same significant effects were not demon-
strated when officers were asked to identify white individu-
als.190 In fact, the officers misremembered black individuals de-
spite the fact that they paid more attention to the black faces 
than to the white faces.191 
Flawed memories can cause officers to see correlations be-
tween blacks and crime that do not exist and to miss correla-
tions between behavior and crime that actually do exist.192 
These illusory correlations193 between race and criminality can 
“persist even in the face of data in which these correlations are 
nonexistent.”194 This can explain why officers continue to stop 
 
 187. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 130 (1999); see also Jonathan A. Fugelsang 
& Kevin N. Dunbar, A Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Understanding 
Causal Reasoning and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 
LONDON 1749, 1751 (2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC1693458/pdf/15590615.pdf (“Several studies have found that in-
dividuals appear to have great difficulty evaluating evidence that is inconsis-
tent with their beliefs . . . . The typical finding is that people are more likely to 
attend to, seek out and evaluate evidence that is consistent with their beliefs 
and ignore or downplay evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs.” (cita-
tions omitted)). Remarkably, cognitive neuroscientists have found that differ-
ent brain structures are involved in evaluating evidence that is consistent 
with prior expectations versus evidence that is inconsistent. KUNDA, supra 
note 29, at 130.  
 188. See Charles M. Judd & Bernadette Park, Definition and Assessment of 
Accuracy in Social Stereotypes, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 112 (1993) (noting that 
people remember more information about others that confirms their stereotypes 
than information that is either irrelevant or disconfirms their preconceptions).  
 189. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 877, 887–88.  
 190. See id. (noting that these difficulties were most acute when officers 
perceived pictures of black people). 
 191. Id. at 886–97. 
 192. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 127. 
 193. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1195 (1995) (defining an “illusory correlation” as “the report by ob-
servers of a correlation between two classes of events which, in reality, (a) are 
not correlated, or (b) are correlated to a lesser extent than reported, or (c) are 
correlated in the opposite direction from that which is reported” (citation 
omitted)).  
 194. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 128. 
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blacks at higher rates than whites despite the fact that hit 
rates demonstrate that the practice is flawed. Officers simply 
do not accurately remember their failed searches. This can oc-
cur because people unintentionally search their memories for 
evidence that confirms an existing hypothesis rather than en-
gaging in a balanced search for evidence that either confirms or 
refutes it.195  
In fact, encountering counterstereotypical individuals—
that is, blacks who are not involved in criminal activity—may 
actually result in strengthening stereotypes through a process 
known as subtyping: “[b]y allocating counterstereotypic indi-
viduals . . . to a subtype that is considered atypical and unrep-
resentative of the group as a whole, one may be able to main-
tain one’s global stereotype of the group even though one knows 
that some group members do not fit the bill.”196 Indeed, the 
more a counterstereotypical person deviates from the stereo-
type, the easier it is to subtype that individual.197 Thus, offi-
cers’ correlations between race and criminality may say more 
about their preexisting stereotypes than about the accuracy of 
their beliefs. 
This section reveals that the failure to be realistic about 
police decisionmaking and judgment has pernicious effects on 
policing and privacy. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is pri-
marily concerned with prohibiting arbitrary invasions of priva-
cy by the government.198 In constructing the doctrine to protect 
 
 195. See id. at 128 (describing experiments highlighting this phenomena). 
For a general discussion, see Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirma-
tion, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 211 (1987). 
 196. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 384. 
 197. Id. at 390 (“[T]he more inaccurate our stereotype of a group, the less 
likely it is to change spontaneously following encounters with group members. 
This is because the more inaccurate our stereotype, the more discrepant it will 
be from the typical group member. Put differently, the typical group member 
will deviate more extremely from more inaccurate stereotypes, and so will be 
dismissed more readily as an exception.”).  
 198. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic 
purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of 
this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbi-
trary invasions by governmental officials.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspec-
tives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 417 (1974) (“A para-
mount purpose of the [F]ourth [A]mendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches 
and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures.”); Tracey Maclin, 
The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 
201 (1993) [hereinafter Maclin, Central Meaning] (“[T]he central meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and discretion.”); David A. 
  
2072 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:2035 
 
against arbitrary invasions, the Court made inaccurate behav-
ioral assumptions about police behavior that actually under-
mines this core value. This leads to policing that fails to protect 
equally the privacy rights of all individuals regardless of their 
race.  
To realize the normative goal of the Fourth Amendment, 
courts should take accurate understandings of decisionmaking 
into account rather than basing their legal standards on as-
sumptions that are empirically unsupportable.199 In the next 
section, I explore how the doctrine might look if courts replaced 
their flawed behavioral assumptions with accurate accounts of 
human behavior. These tentative suggestions will be developed 
in a future article. 
C. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON DOCTRINAL REFORMS 
“[T]he ‘touchstone’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘is reasona-
bleness.’”200 As Professor Maclin observes, “reasonableness is a 
malleable concept.”201 It is judged by taking into account the 
“totality of the circumstances.”202 The Court has considered a 
wide variety of circumstances under the rubric of reasonable-
ness: 
[T]he text of the amendment; history; threats to police safety; the use 
of standardized police procedures; subjective and objective expecta-
tions of privacy; the presence of police coercion; the fact that privacy 
interests are only marginally protected; the potential danger to the 
public at large; the severity of the alleged criminal conduct a suspect 
has committed; whether a suspect poses a threat to the community or 
actively resists an officer’s seizure; and a whole host of other factors 
depending on the circumstances.203 
Surely, considering how implicit biases can cause arbitrary 
invasions of privacy is an appropriate consideration under the 
 
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth 
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 286. 
 199. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1, at 1016–17 (discussing the use of behav-
ioral theories to shape legal incentives). 
 200. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). 
 201. Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 371. 
 202. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997); Robinette, 519 U.S. at 
39; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816 (1996); Ornelas v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996). 
 203. Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 370–71. Professor Maclin argues that 
consideration of racial impact should be added to this list. Id. at 371; see also 
Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35 (rejecting “any ‘litmus-paper test’ or single ‘sentence 
or . . . paragraph . . . rule,’ in recognition of the ‘endless variations in the facts 
and circumstances’ implicating the Fourth Amendment” (citations omitted)). 
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category of reasonableness. While I am not the first to suggest 
that reasonableness should include consideration of racial ef-
fects,204 I am the first to suggest that the reasonableness in-
quiry should include consideration of the behavioral effects of 
implicit social cognitions. Importantly, I am not arguing that 
courts should conduct an inquiry into the subjective intentions 
of individual officers. Such inquiry is unhelpful because officers 
will be unaware of the effects of nonconscious biases on their 
behavior. Since, as is discussed more fully in Part III, implicit 
biases are malleable, police departments and legal doctrine can 
create a situation that reduces the effects of implicit biases on 
behavior. 
The Court often determines the reasonableness of a police 
action by balancing the government’s interest in effective law 
enforcement against the individual’s interest in privacy and se-
curity.205 When the effects of implicit social cognitions on behav-
ior are considered, it is apparent that allowing officers to act on 
their interpretations of ambiguous behavior and to rely on 
memories of their experiences to justify encroachments on pri-
vacy is unreasonable. First, these actions do not serve the gov-
ernment’s interest in effective law enforcement. As the data on 
hit rates206 demonstrate, police waste resources subjecting 
 
 204. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 757, 808 (1994) (“Even if racially disparate impact alone does 
not violate the Constitution, surely equal protection principles call for concern 
when Blacks bear the brunt of a government search or seizure policy. Thus, in 
a variety of search and seizure contexts, we must honestly address racially 
imbalanced effects and ask ourselves whether they are truly reasonable.”); 
Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 371 (arguing that reasonableness should in-
clude consideration of racial impact); Sklansky, supra note 198, at 329 (“What 
is most troubling about the recent vehicle stop decisions are ‘all the circum-
stances’—including the continuing and destructive role of race in American 
policing, the injuries other than forced disclosures suffered at roadside deten-
tions, and the shortcomings of direct restrictions on police abuse and general-
ized guarantees of equality—that the Supreme Court overlooked.”). 
 205. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“‘[T]he key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness—the bal-
ancing of competing interests.’” (citation omitted)); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement 
practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.”); see also Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 198, at 198–99 (“[T]he cen-
tral meaning of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ . . . Whether a par-
ticular search or seizure is reasonable is generally determined by balancing 
the competing interests at stake—the government’s interest in effective law en-
forcement versus the individual’s interest in privacy and personal security.”). 
 206. See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text for a discussion of hit rates. 
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countless innocent blacks to humiliating stops and frisks207 
while failing to stop many whites who are engaged in criminal 
activity. 
Second, these actions hurt law enforcement interests by 
fostering mistrust. Many within black communities perceive 
the constant stopping, questioning, and searching of innocent 
individuals as harassment, which results in distrust, anger, 
and other feelings not conducive to fostering good community-
police relationships or perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal 
justice system.208 Growing numbers of individuals in these 
communities already view the police “as just another gang.”209 
Attitudes towards the police “begin crystallizing during adoles-
cence when youths have greater opportunities for direct and 
indirect contact with officers and other agents of the juvenile 
justice system. By early adulthood, most people’s views of the 
police are fairly well developed, including their perceptions of 
officers’ trustworthiness.”210 Lack of trust in the police and in 
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system can result in 
communities being less safe.211 Researchers have found that 
when citizens distrust the police, not only are they hesitant to 
report crimes and to help with police investigations, but police 
officers are also more at risk of verbal abuse and physical con-
frontations.212  
The implications for police-citizen trust are particularly 
disturbing based on recent evidence that distrust of the police 
can result vicariously. A recent study found that amongst 
blacks, learning about negative police encounters of other 
 
 207. E.g., Thompson, supra note 115, at 959 & n.5 (citing evidence of police 
conducting tens of thousands of fruitless stops and frisks, mostly against 
blacks and Latinos); see supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text. 
 208. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 
835, 843 (2008) (noting the Clinton Administration’s recognition of this per-
ception); Harcourt, supra note 10, at 1329–30 (noting the deleterious effect of 
disproportionate police contact on minority communities); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
645, 646 (2004) (noting these problems and their effect on predominantly 
black, low-income communities); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy 
and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Com-
munities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 237 (2008) (noting that minorities have 
low levels of trust and confidence in the police). See generally PAUL BUTLER, 
LET’S GET FREE (2009). 
 209. David K. Shipler, Living Under Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, 
at A33, available at 1997 WLNR 4891728. 
 210. Flexon et al., supra note 27, at 181 (citations omitted). 
 211. Capers, supra note 208, at 800; Natapoff, supra note 208, at 687–90. 
 212. Flexon et al., supra note 27, at 180 (citations omitted).  
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blacks was significantly related to their attitudes.213 In fact, for 
high-school-aged students, one of the greatest determinants of 
trust in the police was “observ[ing] other students stopped and 
treated with disrespect by the police.”214 Thus, policing affected 
by implicit biases does not serve law enforcement interests. 
Even if it did, the interests such policing serve are negligible 
compared to the violations caused to the dignity, privacy, and 
autonomy interests of individuals, particularly nonwhites.215  
The current Terry doctrine facilitates unreasonable police 
actions because it fails to account for the operation of implicit 
biases on behavior. Consideration of these biases should lead 
courts to question whether the reasonable suspicion test is up 
to the task of preventing intrusions on individual liberty based 
upon nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches. 
The following section suggests some tentative proposals for 
Terry reform that will serve both law enforcement and privacy 
interests by taking the empirical evidence about human behav-
ior and decisionmaking seriously. Importantly, these sugges-
tions are not concrete proposals, but rather some preliminary 
thoughts for future reflection. I hope to begin a conversation 
about how tinkering with Fourth Amendment doctrine may 
provide a mechanism for reducing the effects of implicit bias on 
police behavior. 
1. Return to Probable Cause 
The reasonable suspicion test fails to prevent the police 
from acting on racial hunches. By allowing officers to act on 
their interpretation of ambiguous behavior, the test underpro-
tects the privacy rights of nonwhites; they will be stopped and 
frisked more often than similarly situated whites, not because 
they are acting more suspiciously, but because implicit biases 
likely will affect how police interpret and react to their behav-
ior.  
One solution is to return to the probable cause standard as 
the sole justification for stops and frisks. Probable cause is a 
tougher standard than reasonable suspicion. As Professor Sheri 
Lynn Johnson writes, “[t]he former reaches only completed or 
ongoing crimes, while the latter encompasses imminent crimi-
 
 213. Id. at 182. 
 214. Id. at 187. 
 215. For a powerful discussion of dignitary harms and the Fourth Amend-
ment, see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disre-
spect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257 (2002). 
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nal activity. Probable cause also demands greater confidence in 
the interpretation of the facts observed.”216  
The probable cause standard would require officers to 
gather more information and to observe more unambiguous be-
havior before seizing individuals. The science demonstrates 
that individuation (i.e., compiling more information about an 
individual) can reduce the effects of implicit cognitions on be-
havior.217 Reducing the effects of implicit bias may result in 
stops and searches that are more accurate.  
Data from the Maryland State Police provide some evi-
dence that requiring officers to have probable cause before act-
ing increases accuracy. The data demonstrate that when offi-
cers conducted searches based upon probable cause, their hit 
rates were fifty-three percent. However, when officers asked 
individuals for consent to conduct a search, likely because they 
did not have probable cause, their hit rates dropped to twenty-
two percent.218 
Other commentators have suggested a return to probable 
cause.219 In doing so, they recognized, as I do, that it is unlikely 
that courts would actually implement it. An additional problem 
is that even if implemented, courts might dilute the probable 
cause standard to such an extent that it would operate much as 
the reasonable suspicion test currently does.220 A further prob-
lem with this approach is that the probable cause standard is 
 
 216. Johnson, supra note 175, at 216. 
 217. See, e.g., Devine & Sharp, supra note 30, at 72 (noting that people can 
avoid stereotyping by engaging in individuation—the gathering of more infor-
mation); Margo J. Monteith et al., Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strate-
gy, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 72 (1998) (describing individua-
tion as “actively seeking out individuating information about a person and 
forming impressions of the person based on this information”). See generally 
Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care? The 
Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 145 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1549898 (discussing 
the importance of individualized suspicion). For an inventive rethinking of the 
probable cause standard that might prevent its dilution, see Max Minzner, 
Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913 (2009). 
 218. Gross & Barnes, supra note 181, at 692. 
 219. See, e.g., Harris, Frisking, supra note 135, at 3–6 (noting the hard-
ships that stops and frisks supported by less than probable cause place on cer-
tain groups); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The 
Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1332–33 (1990) 
(opining that the reasonable suspicion standard no longer has a place in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 220. Maclin, supra note 219, at 1331–32 (noting that this has already hap-
pened once). 
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not necessarily immune from the effects of implicit bias. Al-
though it is theoretically more difficult to meet than the rea-
sonable suspicion standard, the probable cause standard is 
“non-technical,” “fluid,” and based upon “common-sense.”221 
Consequently, the standard still requires officers to evaluate 
ambiguous behavior unless they catch an individual red-
handed. 
2. No Automatic Deference 
Currently, courts defer to officer judgments of criminality 
in determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists222 with-
out requiring empirical evidence supporting the officer’s ability 
to make sound conclusions or the reliability of the evidence the 
officer used to make his judgment. For instance, in United 
States v. Sokolow, law enforcement agents relied in part upon a 
drug courier profile to justify a Terry seizure.223 The Ninth Cir-
cuit “essentially rejected the use of inferences based on common 
sense and the shared experience of agents in the field.”224 It 
held that, absent empirical proof of the profile’s reliability, the 
evidence was insufficient to justify a seizure.225  
 
 221. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–32 (1983). 
 222. In fact, the Court shows deference even when those inferences are not 
based upon any actual experience of the officer. For instance, in Terry, the 
Court deferred to Officer McFadden’s conclusion that Terry and Chilton were 
about to commit a robbery despite the fact that the officer admitted having no 
experience observing individuals casing a joint. Suppression Hearing, supra 
note 111, at 1420. 
The Court similarly defers to officer experience, without requiring proof of 
actual experience, when probable cause is at issue. In Ornelas v. United 
States, the Court “recognized that a police officer may draw inferences based 
on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.” 517 U.S. 
690, 700 (1996) (citation omitted). In that case, the Court noted that facts 
which “may suggest only wear and tear” to a layman, “to Officer Luedke, who 
had searched roughly 2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be 
secreted inside the panel. An appeals court should give due weight to a trial 
court’s finding that the officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.” 
Id. The problem here is that although the officer searched 2000 cars in the 
past, there is no evidence of his rate of success. Other commentators similarly 
have questioned the Court’s reliance on officer expertise. See, e.g., Maclin, 
Legacy, supra note 121, at 1306–07. My proposal builds from Maclin’s critique 
by adding the lessons from implicit social cognition to provide an empirical ba-
sis for questioning this reliance. 
 223. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 224. Brief for the United States at 35, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 
(1989) (No. 87-1295). 
 225. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1421. 
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The Supreme Court did not follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead. 
It agreed with the government that empirical proof was unnec-
essary.226 In doing so, it cited United States v. Cortez for the 
proposition that reasonable suspicion “does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of prob-
abilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated 
certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; ju-
rors as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are 
law enforcement officers.”227  
The Court ruled without the benefit of scientific knowledge 
and empirical evidence on human decisionmaking and judg-
ment. What the science demonstrates is that an officer’s com-
mon-sense conclusions about behavior are often wrong or, at 
the very least, may be nonconsciously influenced by the race of 
the person being observed.228 By deferring to an officer’s com-
mon-sense judgments, the Court assumes that officers’ memo-
ries of their experiences are pristine and accurate. However, 
the science refutes this assumption.229 Thus, by blindly defer-
ring, the Court may underprotect the liberty of nonwhites and 
facilitate potentially inefficient policing. 
In order to reduce the effects of implicit bias on policing, 
courts should not defer automatically to officer judgments of 
criminality in determining whether a reasonable suspicion ex-
ists. At the very least, courts should require officers to provide 
empirical support for their inferences before giving those infer-
ences any weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus.230 This 
empirical support should be in the form of the individual offi-
cer’s hit rates. The officer should provide specific information 
that out of X number of seizures based upon criteria Y, this of-
ficer’s percentage of productive stops and frisks is Z. Providing 
this evidence avoids the problem of relying upon the accuracy of 
an officer’s memories of his experiences.231  
 
 226. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8. 
 227. Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).  
 228. See supra Part II.B. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Requiring empirical proof should not be controversial. The Court al-
ready requires plaintiffs in selective enforcement claims to provide empirical 
proof that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. United 
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996); see also United States v. Bar-
low, 310 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring the plaintiff in a selective 
enforcement claim to demonstrate that DEA agents failed to stop whites who 
“look[ed] nervously over their shoulders—but chose not to approach them”). 
 231. In fact, scholars have noted that “few profiles have empirical support, 
and most leave police with unfettered discretion while creating the false im-
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However, aggregate hit rates alone should be insufficient 
to justify a Terry stop because this would undermine the notion 
of individualized suspicion that is at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment.232 For instance, even if an officer demonstrated a 
hit rate of thirty percent for finding contraband when he 
stopped young white men, with close cropped hair, wearing 
baggy pants, and who live in high-income areas, this informa-
tion alone should not entitle officers to stop all young white 
men who meet this description with impunity. Rather, addi-
tional evidence to support the officer’s inference that the par-
ticular individual stopped is likely engaged in criminal activity 
should be required. Thus, aggregate hit-rate data alone should 
not be a sufficient basis for finding a stop and frisk reasonable. 
The important point here is that courts should not defer to 
officer judgments about when an individual’s actions denote 
criminality in the absence of any evidence of the particular of-
ficer’s reliability for making these judgments. When courts de-
termine whether a reasonable suspicion exists, they should 
base their judgments, in part, on some form of empirically vali-
dated evidence rather than relying upon an officer’s personal 
experiences or common-sense conclusions, which the science 
demonstrates are often incorrect.233 Since unproductive stops 
will affect an officer’s aggregate hit rates, requiring officers to 
provide empirical evidence will likely create incentives for them 
to think carefully about the criteria they use before conducting 
Terry stops.234 To the extent that this motivates officers to indi-
viduate, it will decrease the effects of implicit bias on police be-
havior.  
 
pression of the opposite.” Taslitz, supra note 217, at 33 n.172 (citations omit-
ted). For a more complete discussion of this proposal, see L. Song Richardson, 
Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012). 
 232. See Christopher Slogobin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 82–84 (1991) (noting and responding to this critique). But 
see Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth 
Amendment 75–76 (John M. Loin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 530, 2010), 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1665562 (arguing that the phrase 
“individualized suspicion” should be abandoned because it is inaccurate). See 
generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A 
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868 (2006) (examining the impor-
tance of individualized justice in the history of the Fourth Amendment).  
 233. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text; see also TASLITZ, su-
pra note 232, at 261 (“Nothing in antebellum and Reconstruction history les-
sens the central need for the state to justify intrusions on citizens’ privacy, 
property, and free movement absent a high quantity and quality of evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing.”). 
 234. For a similar point, see Taslitz, supra note 217, at 38–39 n.184. 
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3. No Reliance on Race or Race Proxies  
Some courts currently allow officers to rely on race and 
proxies for race (such as consideration of high-crime neighbor-
hoods) to justify Terry seizures.235 Courts assume that these 
considerations help officers ferret out criminal behavior. With-
out consideration of the science, some judges might believe that 
using race and race proxies to infer criminality would more of-
ten than not result in accurate judgments of criminality. How-
ever, the science demonstrates that consideration of race and 
race proxies may make officers less, not more, accurate.  
By countenancing consideration of race to infer criminality, 
courts exacerbate implicit biases by solidifying the association 
between race and crime.236 First, purposefully focusing officer 
attention on blacks and their criminal stereotype makes nega-
tive stereotypes salient and thus more available for use in judg-
ing behavior. This predisposes officers to interpret ambiguous 
behaviors as more suspicious than they might otherwise.237  
While solidifying the association between race and crime 
occurs even when race is not consciously highlighted,238 focus-
ing attention on the race-crime association exacerbates it.239 
Thus, race salience encourages police encounters with blacks. It 
draws police attention to blacks with the assumption that they 
are involved in criminal activity. The nonconscious activation of 
negative racial stereotypes, then, may cause officers to inter-
pret ambiguous behavior as suspicious. 
Second, when approaching the individual to dispel or con-
firm their suspicions, implicit biases may cause officers to non-
consciously behave with aggression. This will trigger a similar 
response, solidifying the stereotype of blacks as aggressive. Of-
ficers may then interpret the aggressive behavior (that they 
unknowingly initiated) as indicating that the individual is 
armed and dangerous, resulting in an invasive, public, and 
humiliating frisk.240 If the officer then finds evidence of crimi-
 
 235. See Harris, Factors, supra note 135, at 671–81 (discussing lower 
courts’ deference to police officers). 
 236. See supra Part I.B. 
 237. See Al Baker, City Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 12, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 9862586. 
 238. See supra Part I. 
 239. See infra Part III. 
 240. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968) (“[I]t is simply fantastic to 
urge that [a frisk] performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands 
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’ It 
is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great 
  
2011] ARREST EFFICIENCY 2081 
 
nal activity, this confirms the stereotype and becomes a more 
memorable event than the occasions when he does not. 
Third, by making race salient, the doctrine encourages of-
ficers to approach black individuals with the expectation of 
finding evidence of criminal activity. Conscious affirmation and 
practice of racial stereotypes facilitates the creation of automat-
ic and nonconscious associations.241 The automatic activation of 
negative stereotypes then has behavioral effects, leading to in-
creased scrutiny, negative evaluations of ambiguous behaviors, 
and negative treatment.242 Thus, conscious consideration of 
race can exacerbate the behavioral effects of implicit bias, neg-
atively affecting nonwhites. 
In order to protect individuals from the arbitrary policing 
caused by the operation of implicit bias, courts should decouple 
the association between race and crime. Courts can accomplish 
this by refusing to consider race and proxies for race in deciding 
whether the police acted reasonably in conducting a stop and 
frisk.243 In fact, courts should go further and clearly state that 
race is irrelevant to a determination of whether a Terry seizure 
is justified. By making this change, the doctrine can play an 
important normative role, potentially influencing an officer’s 
 
indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken 
lightly.” (citations omitted)). 
 241. Devine, supra note 64, at 6 (“Automatic processes involve the uninten-
tional or spontaneous activation of some well-learned set of associations or re-
sponses that have been developed through repeated activation in memory.” 
(emphasis added)); see also John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behav-
ior: Direct Effect of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 231 (1996) (“Preconscious activation of 
mental representations develops from their frequent and consistent activation 
in the presence of a given stimulus event in the environment.”). See generally 
Richard M. Shiffrin & Walter Schneider, Controlled and Automatic Human 
Information Processing: II. Perceptual Learning, Automatic Attending, and a 
General Theory, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 127, 185 (1977) (describing the learning of 
automatic attending). 
 242. See supra Part I. 
 243. I am not dealing here with the situation in which a person of a par-
ticular race is identified as a criminal perpetrator. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 
11, at 1081–82; Johnson, supra note 175, at 225–30. Furthermore, I am not 
arguing for a form of colorblindness. For insightful discussions detailing how 
colorblindness is not a form of race neutrality, but rather a form of racial bur-
dening, see Carbado, supra note 135, at 975, and Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 
“Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 68 (1991). Interestingly, 
psychological experiments also support the view that advocating a colorblind 
perspective increases racial biases. See Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Control-
ling Prejudice and Stereotyping, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, 
AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 30, at 111, 126–27 (citing studies). 
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beliefs about appropriate uses of race in policing.244 At the very 
least, if the refusal to consider race and race proxies makes it 
more difficult for officers to establish reasonable suspicion, of-
ficers will likely be more accurate in the stops they conduct. 
Courts might even consider scrutinizing stops and frisks more 
closely when the individual involved is a member of a racial 
minority in order to counteract the likely effects of implicit bias 
on the officer’s decision to conduct a seizure.245 
4. Rethinking the Exclusionary Rule 
A final and perhaps more controversial solution that is to 
be taken up in a future article is to reconsider the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule.246 Currently, only defendants 
in criminal cases have access to the exclusionary remedy. To 
the extent that allegedly guilty blacks are disproportionately 
represented amongst those seeking exclusion of evidence, the 
exclusionary remedy may have the perverse effect of exacerbat-
ing implicit biases by solidifying the coupling of race and crimi-
nality.247 Perhaps rethinking the exclusionary rule in order to 
reduce its potential effects on implicit biases is necessary, most 
importantly by considering ways to make innocent victims of 
Fourth Amendment violations more salient.  
In conclusion, existing Fourth Amendment doctrine ex-
acerbates the effects of implicit bias on policing by failing to 
take into account empirical evidence of human behavior and 
decisionmaking. Being sensitive to the behavioral effects of im-
plicit bias will better protect all citizens from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The tentative proposals suggested here 
may help propel courts along that path and prevent arbitrary 
invasions of privacy by reducing the effects of implicit bias and 
correcting for them. 
However, reducing the behavioral effects of the automatic 
association between race and crime in proactive policing will 
take more than doctrinal fixes. As others have noted, the law 
 
 244. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 
79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 (2000) (discussing how “law changes behavior by sig-
naling the underlying attitudes of a community or society”). 
 245. See generally Taslitz, supra note 217, at 259 (noting that based upon 
the history of the Fourth Amendment, “[a]ny use of race to establish suspicion 
of crime should be judged skeptically and require strong justification”). 
 246. The exclusionary rule, in certain situations, bars the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 
129 S. Ct. 695, 700–04 (2009) (considering when the exclusionary rule applies). 
 247. See supra discussion Part I. 
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alone may not be the most effective way to address noncon-
scious biases.248 Furthermore, the association between blacks 
and criminality is so entrenched in our society that it would be 
naïve to assume that mere doctrinal changes would be suffi-
cient to break it.249 For this reason, Part III concentrates on 
structural changes within the institution of the police for reduc-
ing the effects of implicit bias on their behavior. 
III.  STRUCTURAL REFORMS   
Police departments likely have practices and internal 
structures in place that promote arbitrary policing by uninten-
tionally strengthening implicit biases. However, since implicit 
biases are malleable, police departments may be able to imple-
ment strategies to moderate their effects. This Part offers sug-
gestions for structural reforms to reduce the effects of implicit 
biases on police behavior and joins the call for more empirical 
work testing directly the behavioral effects of implicit bias on 
legal decisionmaking.250 One significant challenge is that offi-
cers function in precisely the type of environment that encour-
ages and facilitates nonconscious processing; they often must 
make decisions quickly and in situations that are ambiguous, 
potentially dangerous, and where a possible suspect’s appear-
ance, demeanor, and neighborhood are the primary sources of 
information.251  
 
 248. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1899–900 (advocating “caution[ ] 
against approaches to unconscious discrimination—whatever its prevalence 
and whatever the inadequacies of existing law—that rely principally on 
stronger legal coercion as the primary tool to fight implicit discrimination”); 
see also Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1080 (“[W]e need a new model of dis-
crimination for implicit bias . . . . This new model must promote proactive 
structural interventions that minimize harm without relying solely on poten-
tial individual litigation.”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Dis-
crimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460–61 (2001). 
 249. In fact, some even suggest that legal coercion may be counterproduc-
tive. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1900 (“[C]oercion . . . can have a neg-
ative effect on people’s internalization of nondiscrimination norms.”). 
 250. See, e.g., Levinson et al., supra note 26, at 390. In his ingenious study, 
Professor Levinson created a Guilty/Not Guilty IAT to determine whether im-
plicit biases against blacks affect juror decisions of culpability. Perhaps an IAT 
test to determine whether implicit biases affect police officer decisionmaking 
related to suspicious behavior could also be devised.  
 251. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 364–67 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 
4th ed. 1998) (describing rapid and automatic categorization); see also Barden 
et al., supra note 178, at 19–21 (noting the effect of viewing stereotyped indi-
viduals in certain settings increases implicit bias); Mark Schaller et al., Fear 
of the Dark: Interactive Effects of Beliefs About Danger and Ambient Darkness 
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A. REVIEW OF EXISTING PRACTICES 
Police departments should identify practices and proce-
dures that have the potential to exacerbate implicit biases and 
then consider whether they can and should be changed. In 
some instances, safety concerns may counsel against elimina-
tion of an existing procedure even though it has the potential to 
strengthen implicit biases. In other instances, the need for 
change will be obvious and modification easy. 
One easily implemented change is to eliminate the use of 
training videos that portray racial minorities as perpetra-
tors.252 This type of video likely strengthens implicit biases by 
reinforcing the race-criminal stereotype. Likewise, training sim-
ulations and similar practices should be conducted in ways that 
do not bolster racial stereotypes. 
Departments also should reconsider the techniques they 
employ to reduce racial profiling.253 Studies demonstrate that 
making race salient increases activation of implicit stereotypes, 
even when individuals are instructed to avoid using racial ster-
eotypes in their judgments. This phenomenon is known as the 
“rebound effect” and demonstrates that attempts to suppress 
thoughts can make those thoughts “become hyperaccessible 
once people relax their efforts at suppression or become preoc-
cupied with other tasks.”254 This rebound effect can explain 
why consciously trying to avoid considerations of race can lead 
to greater use of racial stereotypes.255 
 
on Ethnic Stereotypes, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 637, 647 
(2003) (noting that darkness increases the activation of danger stereotypes); 
Taslitz, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
 252. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 105, at 48–49 (discussing training videos 
that utilize minority surnames for perpetrators). 
 253. See Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 385 n.223; see also State v. Soto, 
734 A.2d 350, 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (“[T]wo former troopers called 
by the defense who were not reappointed at the end of their terms . . . said 
they were trained and coached to make race based ‘profile’ stops to increase 
their criminal arrests . . . .”); HARRIS, supra note 105, at 240 (describing New 
Jersey police officers admitting to training to profile blacks and Hispanics); 
Weatherspoon, supra note 135, at 453 (discussing an internal Maryland state 
trooper memo encouraging officers to target blacks driving on I-68). Professor 
David Harris identifies myriad ways in which officers, even when not explicitly 
trained to consider race, are implicitly taught to do so through intelligence re-
ports that feature race prominently. HARRIS, supra note 105, at 50. 
 254. Kunda & Sinclair, supra note 31, at 20 (citation omitted). 
 255. Daniel M. Wegner & Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility of Sup-
pressed Thoughts, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 903, 911 (1992); see 
also Sei Jin Ko et al., Sneaking in Through the Back Door: How Category-
Based Stereotype Suppression Leads to Rebound in Feature-Based Effects, 44 
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Thus, both training officers to consider race and instruct-
ing officers to avoid considerations of race can increase arbi-
trary policing by augmenting the effect of implicit biases on 
judgment. For example, in one study, researchers informed 
participants that race could affect their ability to determine 
whether an object was a weapon or a tool.256 Researchers then 
divided the subjects into three groups.257 One group was in-
structed to do its best to avoid using race in making judgments 
about whether an object was a tool or a weapon.258 The second 
group was told to use race in its efforts to distinguish a tool 
from a weapon.259 The final group was given no instruction 
about the use of race.260 
In all three categories, individuals primed with an image of 
a black face were more likely to mistake a tool for a weapon, 
and individuals primed with a white face were more likely to 
mistake a weapon for a tool.261 Counterintuitively, those partic-
ipants told to avoid using stereotypes in their judgments were 
unable to reduce the impact of race on their judgments.262 In 
fact, the instruction to “avoid using race increased the extent to 
which participants made more stereotype congruent versus in-
congruent errors.”263 In sum, the researchers concluded that 
“making race salient increased the tendency to stereotypically 
misidentify objects, regardless of whether race was focused on 
with the intent to avoid its influence, or the intent to employ 
 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 833, 833–34 (2008) (discussing how reduc-
tion in one type of stereotype can increase other stereotypes); C. Neil Macrae 
et al., Out of Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 808–09 (1994) (considering whether 
people can successfully suppress stereotypical thoughts); C. Neil Macrae et al., 
Saying No to Unwanted Thoughts: Self-Focus and the Regulation of Mental 
Life, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578, 578 (1998) (discussing the abili-
ty to self-regulate stereotypical thoughts). But see Margo J. Monteith et al., 
Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 70–72 (1998) (concluding that people with egalitarian val-
ues may be less susceptible to rebound effects). 
 256. B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility 
Bias and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 388 (2002). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 390. 
 262. Id.  
 263. Id.  
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it.”264 The researchers cautioned that their research investi-
gated only the effects of temporary goals on implicit biases. 
Hence, they noted that repeated practice dissociating race from 
stereotypical traits might reduce the automatic association.265  
An important reason to avoid training officers to consider 
race in making judgments of criminality is its obvious effect of 
increasing the association between race and crime. It also en-
courages officers to consciously categorize individuals by race, 
which can increase automatic stereotype activation. For in-
stance, in one study, researchers showed subjects photographs 
of both white and black faces.266 Researchers gave three sets of 
subjects different instructions to categorize the photographs. 
One instruction encouraged racial categorization, while another 
encouraged individuation by asking subjects to consider wheth-
er the individual pictured liked vegetables. The third did not 
encourage categorization at all, but rather asked individuals to 
determine whether a dot was present in the photograph. Re-
searchers found that those subjects encouraged to engage in ra-
cial categorization showed implicit stereotype activation upon 
viewing the photos of black faces.267 However, subjects in-
structed either to individuate or to engage in a task that did 
not require categorization did not activate racial stereotypes.268 
Thus, the science demonstrates that giving individuals a goal 
that encourages individuation rather than racial categorization 
may reduce activation of implicit stereotypes. 
 
 264. Id. at 391. 
 265. Id. at 395; see also Charles Stangor, The Study of Stereotyping, Preju-
dice, and Discrimination Within Social Psychology: A Quick History of Theory 
and Research, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINA-
TION, supra note 30, at 1, 11 (citing studies demonstrating that conscious and 
implicit stereotyping can be reduced with practice denying stereotypical be-
liefs and by designing legal remedies to reduce reliance on stereotypes); infra 
Part III.B.2. 
 266. Wheeler & Fiske, supra note 44, at 57. 
 267. Id. at 62. 
 268. Id.; see also Fiske, supra note 251, at 358–60 (reviewing studies docu-
menting that individuation reduces automatic stereotyping). Similarly, in 
another study, researchers discovered that when individuals were asked to 
decide whether a picture was an inanimate object or a woman, the subjects 
automatically activated gender stereotypes. However, when asked to deter-
mine whether a white dot was present in the photos, automatic gender stereo-
types were not activated. C. Neil Macrae et al., On the Activation of Social Ster-
eotypes: The Moderating Role of Processing Objectives, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 471, 482 (1997). Researchers surmised that the first task made 
gender salient, resulting in automatic stereotype activation. 
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An additional reason to avoid connecting race with crimi-
nality is that encouraging the race-crime connection can create 
a community that supports racial stereotyping. The motivation 
to conform one’s beliefs to those of the ingroup affects implicit 
stereotypes. In one study, individuals showed weaker automat-
ic racial stereotype activation when they perceived a low degree 
of consensus within their group for stereotypical beliefs and 
vice versa.269 
Another area of concern is police deployment patterns. 
Black neighborhoods are simultaneously underpoliced and 
overpoliced. They are underpoliced when it comes to the police 
responding to calls reporting criminal activity.270 Yet, these 
neighborhoods are overpoliced when it comes to proactive polic-
ing.271 Deploying officers to majority-black neighborhoods to 
engage in proactive policing does not seem to affect police re-
sponsiveness to citizen complaints. Studies show that implicit 
biases increase when individuals view blacks in contexts that 
trigger negative stereotypes, such as in poor urban neighbor-
hoods.272 Hence, departments should consider whether it is bet-
 
 269. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influ-
ences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 651 (2001). 
 270. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the 
Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594 (2003) (“Drug enforcement efforts that 
burden some racial minorities may also disproportionately benefit those racial 
minorities whose neighborhoods are most plagued by drug dealing and its as-
sociated problems.”); see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 
19 (1997) (“[T]he principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to 
criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws.”); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1775–76 
(2006) (emphasizing the importance of recognizing the destructive implica-
tions of underenforcement). 
 271. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 174, at 44 (discussing the tendency toward 
“quality of life policing” in high-crime areas which includes stop-and-frisk tac-
tics, pretext stops, and arrests for minor infractions); see also Kenneth B. 
Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on 
Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 391–412 
(2002) (describing the disproportionate arrests and sentences of blacks during 
the war on drugs). 
 272. See, e.g., Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: 
Variability in Automatically Activated Attitudes, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 815, 820 (2001) (noting that exposure to gang incidents increased 
implicit biases); see also Barden et al., supra note 178, at 11 (explaining the 
implicit bias that blacks are athletic but poor students); Laura A. Rudman & 
Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to Violent 
and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133, 
133 (2002) (finding that subjects exposed to violent rap music had increased 
automatic associations to underlying racial stereotypes).  
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ter to refrain from deploying officers to these neighborhoods 
solely to engage in proactive policing when it both strengthens 
implicit biases and does not significantly increase community 
safety.273  
B. DEBIASING STRATEGIES  
This section suggests a number of specific debiasing strat-
egies that may increase arrest efficiency by reducing or negat-
ing the effects of implicit biases. The suggestions are based 
upon techniques that have shown promise in the research con-
text.274 The proposals are divided into four general categories: 
increasing awareness, training, hiring, and incentivizing posi-
tive interactions. 
 
 273. Of course, it will be important to determine, as an empirical matter, 
whether the mere presence of the police reduces crime. 
 274. This section does not discuss all the studies that have implications for 
debiasing the police. For instance, some studies demonstrate that motivation 
can reduce stereotype activation. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regu-
lation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond 
Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845 (2002) (show-
ing people with high internal motivation were more nonprejudiced). These 
findings suggest that changing incentive structures within police departments 
may be an effective way to reduce implicit biases. Furthermore, people who 
are committed to egalitarian goals may be able to control stereotype activa-
tion. See, e.g., Michael Johns et al., Internal Motivation to Respond Without 
Prejudice and Automatic Egalitarian Goal Activation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1514, 1518 (2008) (“Together, these studies provide converging 
evidence that individuals who avoid prejudice because it is personally impor-
tant to them, and not because of perceived social pressures, automatically ac-
tivate egalitarian goals to help minimize expression of implicit race bias.”); 
William W. Maddux et al., Saying No to Negativity: The Effects of Context and 
Motivation to Control Prejudice on Automatic Evaluative Responses, 41 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 33 (2005) (those who are motivated to con-
trol prejudice reactions have automatized control strategies to avoid preju-
dice); Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activa-
tion Through Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
167, 181–82 (1999) (activation of stereotypes can be controlled by egalitarian 
goals); Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconsciously Controlling Stereotyping: 
Implicitly Activated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18 
SOC. COGNITION 151, 171 (2000) (showing that exposure to a member of a ster-
eotyped group leads the egalitarian goal construct to be implicitly activated in 
some people); see also Leslie R.M. Hausmann & Carey S. Ryan, Effects of Ex-
ternal and Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice on Implicit Prejudice: The 
Mediating Role of Efforts to Control Prejudiced Responses, 26 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 222 (2004) (finding that those with internal motivations to 
be nonprejudiced show decreased implicit biases compared to those who are 
only externally motivated). 
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1. Increasing Awareness 
The possibility for moderating or overcoming implicit bi-
ases is at its highest when individuals are aware of the poten-
tial for bias and for controlling it.275 One way to increase officer 
awareness is to teach both police recruits and current officers 
about the results of research into the behavioral effects of im-
plicit bias that may affect their interactions with citizens. For 
example, they should be instructed about the studies that dem-
onstrate that their evaluations of behavior may be affected by 
implicit biases,276 and that these behavioral effects can have se-
rious consequences such as causing them to shoot unarmed 
black men more readily than unarmed white men.277 At the po-
lice academy, a class on the science of implicit bias could be 
added to the curriculum. In police precincts, periodic classes 
could be held that would be mandatory for officers assigned to 
proactive patrols units. 
Another way to increase awareness is to educate officers 
about hit-rate data. Explaining that implicit biases, rather 
than conscious racial animus, can account for the data may re-
duce defensiveness. Discussing the data can also facilitate a 
frank discussion about officer beliefs that racial disparities in 
seizures and frisks exist because of differential crime rates 
amongst ethnic groups.278 The idea is not to force officers to 
 
 275. Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in 
Stereotyping, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 346 (Shelly 
Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); Fiske, supra note 251, at 364; Jack Glas-
er & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 171 (2008); Jost et al., supra note 5, at 56–
57; Lane et al., supra note 21, at 437; Leonard S. Newman & James S. Ule-
man, Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Spontaneous Trait Inference, 16 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 224, 236 (1990); Fritz Strack et al., 
Awareness of the Influence as a Determinant of Assimilation Versus Contrast, 
23 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 59 (1993). 
 276. See supra Part I. 
 277. See supra Part I. 
 278. HARRIS, supra note 105 at 15, 73–74. Sometimes officers admit that 
race is an important consideration in deciding who to stop and investigate. 
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 581 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992) (Keith, 
J., dissenting) (noting the testimony of a DEA agent who stated that at least 
seventy-five percent of the individuals stopped pursuant to the profile were 
black); Jones v. DEA, 819 F. Supp. 698, 723 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (noting that 
Drug Interdiction Unit officers focused on defendants because they were “two 
Hispanic men . . . traveling in the company of a white woman”); David A. Har-
ris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Mat-
ters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268–69 (1999) (quoting two police officers). 
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take problack attitudes,279 but to point out that in the proactive 
policing context, the hit-rate data demonstrate that their as-
sumptions may be incorrect, and their preconceived notions 
may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Professor David Harris 
puts it nicely:  
If a police officer assumes people of color are more likely to commit 
crimes because he knows that African Americans and Latinos are 
overrepresented among people arrested and imprisoned, and he there-
fore investigates people of color more frequently as a result, his 
theory and preexisting beliefs will be confirmed. Of the drivers and 
pedestrians he stops and searches, most will be black or brown. Not 
surprisingly he will then end up arresting primarily black and brown 
individuals. He never stops to think about the rate at which he finds 
illegal behavior among this group versus the rate he might find it 
among a similar number of white drivers and pedestrians. Indeed, it 
has never occurred to him that he might find illegal behavior more of-
ten among a similar number of whites (as the data consistently show). 
. . . His choice of where to look for criminal activity is informed by his 
own and society’s biases.280  
Importantly, the tenor of this discussion should not be ac-
cusatory or critical because, unsurprisingly, police officers will 
likely become defensive if they perceive that they are being ac-
cused of intentional bigotry.281 Rather, the attitude should be 
one of collaboration and teamwork to increase the success rates 
of stops and searches. 
A final idea for increasing awareness is to have recruits 
and officers take the Implicit Association Test (IAT).282 Intro-
duced in 1998, the IAT is the most widely used mechanism for 
revealing the existence of implicit attitudes and stereotypes.283 
The test has produced consistent results demonstrating that 
implicit biases are “pervasive,” unrelated to conscious beliefs, 
 
 279. Studies demonstrate that forcing people to take problack attitudes, for 
example, backfire. Rudman & Lee, supra note 272, at 857. 
 280. HARRIS, supra note 105, at 224–25; see also Glaser & Knowles, supra 
note 275, at 171 (discussing how an implicit belief that one holds implicit neg-
ative racial attitudes can reduce unconscious stereotyping effects). 
 281. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 105, at 108 (describing an instance of law 
enforcement defensiveness). 
 282. For descriptions of how the IAT works, see Banks, supra note 11, at 
1182, Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 21, at 954, and Kang & Lane, supra 
note 5, at 7–8. Paul Butler has noted that for “high-stakes” decisionmakers 
such as judges, some sort of assessment of implicit bias would be valuable. 
Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism, and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1019, 1042 (2006). 
 283. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 21, at 952–53. The IAT tests for 
both implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes. See, e.g., Blair et al., supra 
note 101, at 837. This study also utilizes two other methods for testing implicit 
stereotypes. Id. at 829. 
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and “predict behavior.”284 The IAT will be easy to administer 
because it is available online.285 Officers should be assured that 
taking the IAT is solely for educational purposes and that their 
results will remain confidential. Importantly, those who devel-
oped the IAT oppose its use for selection decisions, including 
employment decisions.286 
For some officers, learning about hit rates and implicit bias 
research, as well as taking the IAT, will persuade them that 
implicit attitudes and stereotypes exist. However, there will be 
skeptics. Nonetheless, these three ideas for increasing aware-
ness will educate many officers about implicit biases and their 
behavioral effects.  
2. Training 
A 2007 study involving police officers provides intriguing 
evidence that extensive training of officers to individuate may 
reduce the effects of implicit stereotyping.287 This study tested 
experimental shooter-bias situations in which individuals mis-
takenly shot unarmed blacks and mistakenly failed to shoot 
armed whites as a result of implicit social cognitions.288 In this 
study, researchers found that officers as well as civilians acti-
vated negative black stereotypes upon viewing black individu-
als.289 As a result, both officers and civilians were quicker to 
shoot an unarmed black than an unarmed white.290 
However, officers performed much better than civilians did. 
Officers were better able to exercise control over their automat-
ic stereotypes and performed much better than civilians when 
 
 284. Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 8. By a “conservative estimate 
. . . [s]eventy-five percent of Whites (and fifty percent of blacks) show anti-
black bias.” Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1072. A 2009 comprehensive 
study showed that behavioral effects can be predicted from implicit bias 
scores. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit 
Association Test: III, Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 32 (2009). This meta-analysis included 122 studies and 
14,900 research subjects and demonstrated that IAT scores predicted behav-
iors in the black-white discrimination context better than explicit reports indi-
vidual’s did. Id. at 19–20, 32.  
 285. PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited May 
6, 2011). 
 286. Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 29. 
 287. Cf. Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 68, at 1020–22 (noting that 
something in police training procedures may make police less likely to act on 
implicit biases than the community at large). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
  
2092 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:2035 
 
making decisions whether to shoot. The researchers tentatively 
suggested that their training and experience “may allow offi-
cers to more effectively exert executive control in the 
shoot/don’t-shoot task, essentially overriding response tenden-
cies that stem from racial stereotypes.”291 
An earlier shooter bias study involving police officers found 
that, after repeated exposure to pairings where race and having 
a weapon were unrelated, they exhibited reduced shooter bias 
relative to initial trials.292 Other studies similarly demonstrate 
that repeatedly pairing race with a nonstereotypical trait re-
sulted in reduced implicit race bias.293 Importantly, then, it ap-
pears that training can reduce implicit biases.  
Field exercises or simulations where officers are trained to 
dissociate race from criminality may capitalize on the effective-
ness of training to reduce the behavioral effects of implicit bias. 
Of course, it is one thing to suggest such an idea and another to 
determine whether it is advisable. Ideas such as this one raise 
difficult questions. Is race always irrelevant to assessing crimi-
nality? If not, perhaps officers should not be trained to disso-
ciate the two. On the other hand, to the extent that racial ster-
eotypes do not associate whites with criminality, such training 
 
 291. Id. at 1021. For a summary of the study, see Jost et al., supra note 5, 
at 51. A recent law review article utilizes shooter bias studies to analyze gun 
control laws and policies. See Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit 
Bias and the Second Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 292. Plant & Peruche, supra note 137, at 182. The researchers caution that 
“as of yet, there is no evidence that the elimination of bias in response to the 
simulation generalizes to other types of responses (e.g., decisions in the field).” 
Id. at 183. 
 293. See, e.g., E. Ashby Plant et al., Eliminating Automatic Racial Bias: 
Making Race Non-Diagnostic for Responses to Criminal Suspects, 41 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 154 (2005). Note that in this study, partic-
ipants were civilians and not officers. Id. at 144. The researchers believed that 
if they told the participants to avoid considering race this would have in-
creased bias in that group compared to those who had not been told to avoid 
considering race. Id. at 154. The researchers surmised this was a result of sub-
jects learning that race was nondiagnostic, rather than being told that they 
should not consider race that made the difference. Id. In another study, show-
ing participants repeated pairs that linked black faces with nonathletic objects 
reduced the stereotype of blacks as athletes. B. Michelle Peruche & E. Ashby 
Plant, Racial Bias in Perceptions of Athleticism: The Role of Motivation in the 
Elimination of Bias, 24 SOC. COGNITION 438, 448–49 (2006). But see Anthony 
J. Bishara & B. Keith Payne, Multinomial Process Tree Models of Control and 
Automaticity in Weapon Misidentification, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 524, 531 (2009) (concluding tentatively that controlled processes, 
more than automatic processes, control weapon misidentification). 
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may simply ensure that nonwhites are treated similarly to 
whites.  
In another study, researchers found that it was possible to 
reduce the effects of implicit biases on behavior by asking indi-
viduals to develop a strategy for what they would do or think 
when they encounter a stereotyped group member.294 In the 
study, researchers asked subjects to “firmly commit” them-
selves to thinking “safe” each time they saw a black face.295 
Remarkably, subjects who committed themselves to this “count-
erstereotypic . . . intention” reduced the effects of automatic 
stereotyping on their ability to accurately differentiate weapons 
from innocuous objects.296 This method holds the intriguing 
possibility that simply asking police officers to commit them-
selves to thinking, “If I see a black individual, I will think inno-
cent” or some other appropriate counterstereotypic intent may 
reduce the effects of implicit bias on their behavior towards 
blacks. For example, officers might commit themselves to 
thinking, “If I see a black individual that I believe is acting 
suspiciously, I will first consider whether I would have viewed 
the same actions as suspicious if the individual was white” be-
fore conducting a Terry seizure. This idea builds from Professor 
Cynthia Lee’s race-switching jury instruction that would ask 
jurors if they would feel the same way about a homicide if the 
defendant was white and the victim was black.297 Other tech-
niques that have worked in the lab to reduce the automatic ac-
tivation of stereotypes include extensive practice denouncing 
stereotypes298 or affirming counterstereotypes,299 and the use of 
mental imagery.300 
 
 294. Brandon D. Stewart & B. Keith Payne, Bringing Automatic Stereotyp-
ing Under Control: Implementation Intentions as Efficient Means of Thought 
Control, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1334, 1342 (2008). 
 295. Id. at 1336. 
 296. Id. at 1342–43. It is interesting that participants who simply tried to 
avoid bias, but who formed no specific plan for doing so, were unable to reduce 
automatic racial bias. See id. at 1344. Furthermore, this method of reducing 
implicit stereotypes did not result in the “rebound” effect that subjects showed 
in other experiments when they simply were told to avoid using stereotypes. 
See id. at 1342–44; see also Bodenhausen et al., supra note 243, at 118. 
 297. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND 
FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 224 (2003). 
 298. Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of Train-
ing in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J. 
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 871, 876 (2000). The effect only lasted for twen-
ty-four hours. Id. 
 299. Dasgupta, supra note 104, at 272. Affirming counterstereotypes may 
work more effectively than denouncing stereotypes. Id. But see Bertram Gaw-
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Training officers to focus their attention on goals that en-
courage individuation may reduce implicit bias.301 How this is 
accomplished will be important. Asking officers to gather more 
evidence of suspicious behavior prior to engaging in a stop and 
frisk may actually cause officers to interpret the target’s behav-
ior as more suspicious than he otherwise would because of the 
activation of implicit stereotypes.302 Instead, it may be more ef-
fective to ask officers in the field to determine whether the ac-
tions they observe are consistent with innocence. This formula-
tion will focus attention away from criminality and guilt. In 
other words, instead of encouraging the gathering of evidence 
to substantiate suspicions of guilt (which will increase bias), it 
asks officers to ensure that innocent people are not wrongfully 
stopped. Thus, the officer’s point of view when observing people 
on the street is to interpret ambiguous behavior as evidence of 
innocence or to look for signs of innocence rather than signs of 
guilt. 
This section has sketched the outlines of some training 
strategies that may moderate implicit biases amongst the po-
lice. However, we should exercise caution in directly translat-
 
Wronski et al., When “Just Say No” Is Not Enough: Affirmation Versus Nega-
tion Training and the Reduction of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 44 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 370, 375 (2008) (finding that affirmation re-
duced automatic stereotype activation while negation training enhanced acti-
vation). 
 300. See Blair et al., supra note 101. The study dealt with reducing gender 
stereotypes and participants were asked “to take a few minutes to imagine 
what a strong woman is like, why she is considered strong, what she is capable 
of doing, and what kinds of hobbies and activities she enjoys.” Then, they were 
asked to write a short paragraph describing their image. Id. at 830. According 
to psychologist Nilanjana Dasgupta: 
[W]hen people engage in cognitive elaboration exercises that increase 
the salience of counterstereotypes or that encourage a different way of 
thinking, such directed thinking increases the accessibility of count-
erstereotypic associations linked to outgroups, which in turn tempo-
rarily alleviates implicit bias against outgroups . . . . [E]ven when im-
plicit judgments are made in highly time-pressured situations they 
can be debiased if people acquire concrete strategies that allow them 
to override and modify their automatic responses. These strategies 
function as detailed action plans on how to exert control whereas the 
mere instruction to avoid bias is clearly not sufficient and sometimes 
even counterproductive.  
Dasgupta, supra note 104, at 278. For a description of other techniques, in-
cluding taking the perspective of others, see Devine & Sharp, supra note 30, at 
73–74. 
 301. See Blair, supra note 29, at 242, 250, 252 (noting and discussing situa-
tions where focusing on completing goals reduces implicit bias effects).  
 302. See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text. 
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ing lab results to the real world of policing. As noted by Profes-
sor Richard Banks, the question of how to translate laboratory 
findings into real-life policing is complicated. If, for example, 
nonwhites are more likely to have a weapon and to shoot offi-
cers, then the decision to train officers to disassociate race from 
the likelihood of having a weapon may make officers’ jobs more 
dangerous.303 This Article does not seek to answer these diffi-
cult policy questions. Rather, it simply highlights the need to 
think about reducing the effects of implicit bias on officer behav-
ior and to identify ways of doing so. 
Furthermore, a richer base of scientific knowledge address-
ing ways to alleviate implicit biases in general and within po-
lice departments in particular is necessary in order to propose 
more concrete solutions for training practices to debias the po-
lice.304 In particular, it will be important for social scientists 
and police departments to collaborate on future research to dis-
cover techniques that will work within the police culture. Police 
precincts have already participated in a number of studies, 
providing a useful roadmap for planning other successful collab-
orations.305  
3. Hiring 
An individual’s cohort, both personally and at the 
workplace, may be important in reducing implicit biases. For 
instance, one study found that an officer reporting more posi-
tive personal contacts with blacks was less likely to have nega-
tive beliefs about the criminality and violence of blacks.306 Fur-
thermore, positive personal contacts were the “only significant 
predictor” of a reduction in shooter bias.307  
This has implications for job interview questions. Perhaps 
potential hires should be asked to describe positive personal 
 
 303. R. Richard Banks et al., Race, Crime, and Antidiscrimination, in 
BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3, 16 
(Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008). 
 304. Dasgupta, supra note 104, at 279 (calling for more empirical research 
into “particular bias reduction strategies [that may] be translated from labora-
tory paradigms to real-word interventions”). 
 305. See, e.g., Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 68; Correll, Dilemma, su-
pra note 22; Eberhardt et al., supra note 42; Peruche & Plant, supra note 185. 
 306. Peruche & Plant, supra note 185, at 196; see also Stephen C. Wright et 
al., The Extended Contact Effect: Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and 
Prejudice, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 74 (1997) (having cross-
racial friendships can improve racial attitudes). 
 307. Peruche & Plant, supra note 185, at 197. 
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experiences they have had with nonwhites. Certainly, such 
questions are job related to the extent that such contacts may 
affect officer assessments of nonwhite suspects. If potential of-
ficers have had no experience or no positive experience with 
blacks, for example, departments should consider this factor in 
hiring. If hired, this officer might require additional training or 
perhaps should not be deployed to black neighborhoods. 
Additionally, there is evidence that exposure to counterster-
eotypic group members, especially over the long term, reduces 
implicit biases.308 Not only does this provide support for asking 
officers about their personal contacts with nonwhites, but it al-
so supports increasing the diversity of police departments. Fur-
thermore, increasing diversity will decrease implicit biases 
both by providing more opportunities for officers to work in co-
operative relationships with peers of different races and by 
changing the social norms and attitudes of departments.309 Sim-
ilarly, promoting nonwhites to positions of authority may also 
 
 308. Dasgupta, supra note 104, at 272 (“[L]ongterm immersion, then, in 
counterstereotypic social contexts may reduce the default accessibility of ster-
eotypes or enhance the chronic accessibility of counterstereotypes, thereby de-
creasing the likelihood of biased automatic judgments and evaluations in the 
future.” (citations omitted)); Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 101; Nilanja-
na Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context Matters: The Influence of 
Long-Term Contact and Short-Term Exposure to Admired Outgroup Members 
on Implicit Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 26 SOC. COGNITION 112, 119–
21 (2008); David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, The Three Cs of Reducing 
Prejudice and Discrimination, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 
239, 249 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) (explaining that fostering cooperation ver-
sus competition helps to reduce racial bias). 
 309. See, e.g., Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and Condoning 
Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 993, 995 (1994) (finding that social influence strongly affects reac-
tions to racism and noting that opinions of racism may derive from a lack of 
interracial experience); Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Reducing the Expression 
of Racial Prejudice, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 101, 103 (1991) (noting that vocalization 
of biased attitudes can affect the behavior of others); Sechrist & Stangor, su-
pra note 269, at 649–52 (finding that peer attitudes can influence racial atti-
tudes and behaviors); see also Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 29, at 47–49 
(working together can motivate people to make more accurate, nonstereo-
typed, judgments); Norman Miller, Personalization and the Promise of Contact 
Theory, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 387, 391–92 (2002); Linda R. Tropp & Thomas F. 
Pettigrew, Differential Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Affective 
and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1145, 1154–56 (2005) (finding that contact between racial groups is an 
important factor in affecting responses to outgroup members). For a general 
discussion of the benefits of diversity in reducing implicit biases, see Boden-
hausen et al., supra note 243, at 128–29. 
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be important because it may affect patrol officers’ implicit bi-
ases.310 
4. Incentivizing Positive Interactions 
Efforts should be made to involve officers in positive inter-
actions with members of the communities they police. One 
study involving police officers demonstrated that those who had 
had negative contacts with blacks reported higher levels of 
negative expectations of blacks, including about their propensi-
ty for violence and criminality, than those who had had positive 
experiences.311 Increasing the proportion of positive contacts 
between the community and the police—especially amongst 
those officers who will be patrolling those neighborhoods—will 
be important to minimize the stereotypical connection between 
blacks and criminality. Departments should find ways to create 
incentives to encourage officers to engage in positive expe-
riences with community members. These community-police in-
teractions should include opportunities for working together in 
ways that reduce status differences because this encourages 
individuals to make judgments that are less reliant on stereo-
types.312 
 
 310. See, e.g., P.J. Henry & Curtis D. Hardin, The Contact Hypothesis Revis-
ited: Status Bias in the Reduction of Implicit Prejudice in the United States 
and Lebanon, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 862, 867 (2006) (finding that contact with low-
er status outgroup members has a reduced effect in diminishing biases of 
higher status ingroup members); Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Ef-
fects of Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 181–82 (2003) (finding that the anticipation of interacting 
with a higher status outgroup member reduces bias, but anticipated interac-
tions with lower status outgroup members does not); Stacey Sinclair et al., So-
cial Tuning of Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of Affiliative Motivation, 
89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 584 (2005) (noting that those in su-
perior positions are less likely to adjust their perceptions to match those in in-
ferior positions). But see Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Who’s in 
Charge? Effects of Situational Roles on Automatic Gender Bias, 44 SEX ROLES 
493, 506 (2001) (noting that when men interact with women in a superior posi-
tion their bias increases); Linda Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black 
Professional: Motivated Inhibition and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885, 888 (1999) (receiving criticism from an 
outgroup member can increase implicit biases). 
 311. Peruche & Plant, supra note 185, at 197. 
 312. See Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 29, at 44–46; Johnson & Johnson, 
supra note 308, at 249 (creating cooperation versus competition helps to re-
duce racial bias); Lowery et al., supra note 104, at 581–83 (motivating people 
to develop relationships with a stereotyped group can reduce stereotype acti-
vation); Miller, supra note 309, at 391 (greater observable differences between 
individuals may result in greater categorization). 
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  CONCLUSION   
The failure of judges to account for the effects of implicit 
bias on police behavior and decisionmaking has resulted in a 
Fourth Amendment legal regime that unintentionally streng-
thens the effects of implicit bias on police behavior. This Article 
argues that courts should take the science of implicit social 
cognition into account and attempt to construct legal doctrine 
in a manner that more effectively protects privacy against arbi-
trary government intrusion. Considering the science also pro-
vides a framework for engaging police departments in efforts to 
uncover institutional structures and practices that may hinder 
effective policing and for thinking creatively about institutional 
solutions.  
Consideration of the science of implicit social cognition 
does not provide easy answers to complicated Fourth Amend-
ment questions. Nor does consideration of this social science al-
low courts to avoid making difficult normative judgments. 
However, acknowledging the ways in which race can impact po-
licing, even in the absence of conscious bias, will allow courts 
and other institutions to ask the right questions and to avoid 
unintended consequences. 
This Article focused on the unintended and harmful conse-
quences that result from a stop-and-frisk jurisprudence based 
upon unstated but behaviorally inaccurate assumptions about 
police decisionmaking capabilities. The failure to question 
these assumptions and to test them against the empirical social 
sciences results in doctrine that undermines the core values of 
the Fourth Amendment. This Article urges scholars to study 
other criminal procedure doctrines to determine whether the 
norms and rights sought to be protected are undermined by in-
accurate behavioral assumptions. 
